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A Fixed Game 
THE FRUSTRATIONS OF TICKET SCALPING AND 
THE REALITIES OF ITS SOLUTIONS 
 “Ticketing, to put it bluntly, is a fixed game.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of Hurricane Sandy, renowned musicians 
including Billy Joel and Bruce Springsteen performed for free in 
order to raise funds for relief efforts.2 Unfortunately, for many 
fans of these world-famous performers the closest they got to the 
stage was from the seat of their couch, as ticket scalpers quickly 
hijacked the ticket market through predatory purchasing and 
inflated prices.3 Although the show appeared to be sold out 
within minutes, days before the show hundreds of seats were 
available through the secondary ticket market at prices 
“rang[ing] from $790 to $6,500, many times their face value.”4 
This was not the only time in recent history that New Yorkers 
 
 1 N.Y. ATT’Y GEN., OBSTRUCTED VIEW: WHAT’S BLOCKING NEW YORKERS FROM 
GETTING TICKETS 3 (2016), https://ag.ny.gov/pdfs/Ticket_Sales_Report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/L47D-8MWW] [hereinafter OBSTRUCTED VIEW]; see also 30A C.J.S. Ent. and 
Amusement § 155 (2017) (“‘Ticket scalping’ is the common name given to the practice of 
selling tickets to popular entertainment events at prices which greatly exceed the 
established price for those tickets”). 
 2 Kara Warner, 12-12-12 Concert Raises $30 Million for Sandy Relief, MTV 
NEWS (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.mtv.com/news/1698922/12-12-12-concert-raised-30-
million-sandy-relief/. [https://perma.cc/D55E-UK5P] The concert was considered “one of 
the largest gatherings of major rock musicians in recent memory,” included 
performances from “Bruce Springsteen and the E Street Band, Dave Grohl, Eric Clapton, 
Billy Joel, Eddie Vedder, Roger Waters, the Who, Kanye West and Paul McCartney, 
among others.” James C. McKinley Jr., Benefit’s Producers Condemn Scalpers, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 7, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/08/arts/music/producers-of-12-
12-12-benefit-concert-assail-scalpers.html?partner=rss&emc=rss. 
[https://perma.cc/9DLH-QPKM]. 
 3 McKinley, supra note 2. The 13,500 tickets sold out on Ticketmaster within 
minutes of being released and were being resold through StubHub on the same day. Id. 
 4 James C. McKinley Jr., Bill Seeks to Make Resale of Tickets for Benefit 
Concerts Illegal, N.Y. TIMES: ARTS BEAT BLOG (Dec. 12, 2012 2:35 PM), https://artsbeat.
blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/bill-seeks-to-make-resale-of-tickets-for-benefit-concerts-
illegal/ [https://perma.cc/8NS5-BANB]. Tickets for the floor were being resold for as much 
as $48,000. McKinley, supra note 2. 
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were priced out of a charity event,5 but it certainly sparked the 
need for reform.6 Although ticket scalping itself is not illegal in 
New York, newer legislation aims to further criminalize the 
predatory means that scalpers use to buy tickets in high 
quantities during online sales.7 
Ticket scalping is the practice of reselling tickets to 
popular events at a rate significantly above face value.8 The 
recent growth of the secondary ticket market is largely resulting 
from the use of ticket purchasing software or “bots” in online 
ticket sales.9 These “aggressive computer programs” allow users 
to bypass an internet ticket site’s security measures and then 
purchase a large quantity of tickets to an event, forcing fans to 
rely on the secondary market’s less regulated prices.10 While 
recently enacted legislation in New York and the 2016 Better 
Online Ticket Sales (BOTS) Act are “step[s] in the right 
direction,” these actions are not enough to ensure that 
consumers have a fair opportunity to get tickets at face value 
through online sales.11 Demand for high profile shows like 
Hamilton is inevitable,12 but there are greater concerns than the 
quantity of tickets for sale.13 The problem plaguing the 
entertainment industry for over two centuries is the lack of fair 
 
 5 See Nicole Spector, Scalpers Ignore Outcry, Sell Their ‘Free’ Tickets to See the 
Pope, NBC NEWS (Sept. 25, 2015, 11:11 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/pope-
francis-visits-america/scalpers-ignore-outcry-sell-their-free-tickets-see-pope-n433676 
[https://perma.cc/WDP7-AAYK]. 
 6 McKinley, supra note 4. 
 7 Gerald B. Silverman, Ticket Industry Bracing for New York Law Expansion, 
Electronic Com. & L.Rep. (BNA) (May 31, 2017), https://www.bna.com/ticket-industry-
bracing-n73014451490/ [https://perma.cc/9H2A-UEYN]. 
 8 Arlotta v. Bradley Ctr., 349 F.3d 517, 518 (7th Cir. 2003); Paul J. Criscuolo, 
Comment, Reassessing the Ticket Scalping Dispute: The Application, Effects and Criticisms 
of Current Anti-Scalping Legislation, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 189, 189 (1995). 
 9 Alexis Kramer, Pushy Ticket-Buying Bots Feel Heat from Federal, State 
Officials, 16 Computer Tech. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 184 (Apr. 3, 2015). 
 10 Robert J. McFadden, Note, The BOTS Act: A Small Step for Fankind When 
a Giant Leap is Needed, 55 WASHBURN L. J. 427, 428 (2016). 
 11 Dana Jaskier, Keep the Tickets with the Fans: A Proposal for a Federal Law 
to Protect Consumers Against Price Gouging and Counterfeit Tickets in the Secondary 
Ticketing Market, 44 W. ST. U. L. REV. 83, 102 (2017); see infra Section I.B.2. 
 12 See Ben Sisario, Congress Moves to Curb Ticket Scalping Banning Bots Used 
Online, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/08/business/media/
ticket-scalping-bots-act.html [https://perma.cc/D3BA-GF5L] (“Critics say bots feed a 
high-priced resale market that pushes tickets out of reach of ordinary consumers, 
particularly for hot events like ‘Hamilton.’”). Concertgoers, however, have had the 
opportunity to bid on Hamilton tickets through the show’s online digital lottery. Olivia 
Clement, Broadway Hamilton Increasing Number of $10 Lottery Tickets, PLAYBILL (Jan. 
29, 2017), http://www.playbill.com/article/broadway-hamilton-increasing-number-of-10-
lottery-tickets. [https://perma.cc/MRT2-Q8GL]. Those who win the lottery have are given 
a sixty-minute window to purchase their tickets and then their “[s]eats are assigned at 
the discretion of the box office,” which prevents the tickets from being transferred. Id. 
 13 See OBSTRUCTED VIEW, supra note 1, at 3 (“The problem is not simply that 
the demand for prime seats exceeds supply, especially for the most in-demand events.”). 
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opportunity for consumers to purchase their tickets from the 
primary marketer at the primary marketer’s original price.14 
As consumers and performers have been outspoken about 
reforming ticket purchasing legislation, primary ticket 
marketers have also showed interest in changing the industry.15 
One giant in the primary market, Ticketmaster, has taken the 
initiative by developing its own program to try and diminish the 
presence of scalpers.16 Similar to efforts made through legislation 
and independent efforts of artists, ticket scalpers have 
unfortunately found their way around these new solutions.17 The 
issue with much of the anti-ticket scalping legislation is that it 
aims to combat the problem after it has already happened.18 To 
ensure that consumers have a fair opportunity to purchase 
tickets at face value, primary ticket marketers must be held 
accountable for how their tickets are being purchased and place 
further restrictions on how these tickets can be transferred after 
the initial purchase. 
This note will proceed in the following four parts. Part I 
of this note provides the history of ticket scalping and the 
legislation, both state and federal, that has been enacted to 
address it. This Part highlights the origins of ticket scalping and 
how the secondary ticket market has gained control over the 
entertainment industry. Additionally, this Part addresses the 
use of bots in the ticket scalping timeline and how the New York 
State legislature and the federal government have sought to 
diminish the impact of the growing secondary ticket market. 
Part II explains the predatory nature of the secondary ticket 
market and how it is often left as consumers’ only option for 
buying tickets. Part III illustrates the concerns of artists and 
other players in the entertainment industry. This Part 
recognizes the initiatives taken by primary ticket marketers and 
the performers themselves, as well as how they are negatively 
impacted by ticket scalping. Lastly, Part IV advocates for a new 
 
 14 See KERRY SEGRAVE, TICKET SCALPING: 1850–2005 at 3 (2007). 
 15 See infra Part III. 
 16 Robert Levine, Taylor Swift is the Latest Superstar to Use Ticketmaster’s 
Verified Fan Program—But Does it Work?, BILLBOARD (Aug. 25, 2017), http://
www.billboard.com/articles/business/7942004/taylor-swift-ticketmaster-verified-fan-
program-does-it-work [https://perma.cc/YQ29-5HD5]. 
 17 See Steve Knopper, Is Ticketmaster’s New Resale Program Helping or 
Hurting Fans?, ROLLING STONE (May 27, 2014), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/is-
ticketmasters-new-resale-program-helping-or-hurting-fans-20140527 [https://perma.cc/
48V9-FVB] (“Whether Ticketmaster does it or doesn’t do it, it’s out there on other sites.”). 
 18 New York law and the BOTS Act police the resale of tickets, rather than 
protecting consumers in the initial sale. Better Online Ticket Sales Act of 2016, Pub. L. 
No. 114-274, 130 Stat. 1401, 1401 (2016) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45c (2012 
& Supp. IV 2016)); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. § 25.24 (McKinney 2017). 
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direction in combating predatory ticket purchasing. This Part 
establishes proactive ticket scalping regulation, which would: (1) 
enjoin secondary marketers from allowing bot-using ticket scalpers 
to utilize their resale platforms; (2) hold primary marketers 
accountable for the rapid growth of the secondary ticket market; 
and (3) require primary marketers to adopt more secure 
purchasing mechanisms that restrict transferability without 
harming consumers. 
I. FROM BROADWAY TO BOTS: A HISTORY OF TICKET 
SCALPING 
“Ticket scalping is probably as old as tickets.”19 
Ticket scalping has persisted and worsened, for over two 
centuries.20 While there is evidence of the practice dating as far 
back as the Roman Empire, when tickets for the seats closest to 
the emperor were scalped outside the Roman forum,21 the 
practice is believed to have first emerged in the United States 
during the late nineteenth century, when scalpers sold unused 
portions of railroad tickets.22 Near the turn of the century, the 
practice evolved and claimed its first victim: Broadway.23 
“Sidewalk men,” selling high-priced tickets outside of Broadway 
theatres, were considered “[t]he greatest evil that theatergoers 
in [New York City] have to contend with.”24 Through the 
twentieth century, the practice was defined by ticket scalpers 
standing outside a venue trying to sell tickets to people right 
before the show started.25 Before online sales became the primary 
medium for purchasing tickets, “sidewalk men” avoided waiting 
on physical lines by using proxies and other means to evade the 
security measures put in place by primary ticket marketers.26 
While icing, a form of bribing the primary ticket distributor, and 
 
 19 John Seabrook, The Price of the Ticket, NEW YORKER, Aug. 10 & 19, 2009, 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/08/10/the-price-of-the-ticket 
[https://perma.cc/6LFR-XJNM]. 
 20 See Jaskier, supra note 11, at 85. 
 21 Brad Parks, Ticket Scalping Has a New Name and Image, NJ.COM (Jan. 28, 
2008, 6:00 AM), http://www.nj.com/giants/index.ssf/2008/01/ticket_scalping_has_new_name_
a.html [https://perma.cc/3M8E-7EV8]. 
 22 See McFadden, supra note 10, at 433–34. 
 23 See Seabrook, supra note 19. 
 24 Id. (“[A] local magistrate named Crane said in 1901,” that ticket speculators 
“are practically highwaymen and hold up everybody that goes to a place of amusement.”). 
 25 See Andrew Kandel & Elizabeth Block, The “De-Icing” of Ticket Prices: 
Proposal Addressing the Problem of Commercial Bribery in the New York Ticket Industry, 
5 J. L. & POL’Y 489, 494 (1997). 
 26 James A. Devine, Ticket Scalping in the Late 1800s and the Early 2000s—Much 
Has Changed, Much is the Same, SETON HALL LAW STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP 1, 1 (2014). 
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other illicit means for purchasing tickets in bulk harmed fans 
greatly, it was not until advancements in online ticketing and 
resale that the ticket scalping industry grew exponentially.27 
In the twentieth century, ticket scalping became more 
innovative and technology-based, widening the gap between the 
price that the primary marketer set and what the consumer 
actually paid for the ticket.28 The primary marketer is the agent 
that initiates the first transaction for the sale of the ticket—
these are the Ticketmasters of the world.29 A secondary marketer 
is a ticket resale platform, such as StubHub or SeatGeek, wherein 
scalpers sell the tickets obtained from primary marketers at 
unregulated prices.30 Given that there are no legal limits on how 
much a ticket can be resold for, scalpers stand to make a large 
profit off of a ticket that they paid face value for from the 
primary marketer.31 The secondary marketer collects a fee from 
both the seller and the buyer, often a percentage of the ticket price 
and a predetermined but unspecified service fee, respectively.32 
Since bot usage prevents average consumers from entering into 
the primary market for certain high-profile events, scalpers and 
secondary marketers stand to gain a tremendous profit from 
ticket resale, none of which will ever be seen by the artist 
performing the show. 
 
 27 See Kandel & Block, supra note 25, at 489–90 (“‘Ice’ is money paid, in the 
form of a gratuity, premium or bribe, in excess of the printed box office price of a ticket, 
to an operator of any ‘place of entertainment’ or their agent, representative or employee. 
Box office employees and their supervisors who control the original sale and distribution 
of tickets are such agents.”(footnotes omitted));see also Jaskier, supra note 11, at 86. 
 28 See Jaskier, supra note 11, at 86 (“[B]oundless profits are possible because 
of the considerable difference between the low initial price of the tickets and the higher 
market value on the secondary market.”). 
 29 The Event Ticketing Industry is Broken and in Need of Disruption, AVENTUS 
(May 19, 2017), https://blog.aventus.io/the-event-ticketing-industry-is-broken-and-in-
need-of-disruption-a60781c3c699 [https://perma.cc/944Z-AHT7]. 
 30 Id.; see also What’s SeatGeek?, SEATGEEK, https://seatgeek.com/about 
[https://perma.cc/ECC7-T7Q6]; About Us, STUBHUB, https://www.stubhub.com/about-us 
[https://perma.cc/S8XB-G95H]. 
 31 Neither federal nor state law impose regulations on how much a ticket may 
be resold for. Better Online Ticket Sales Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-274, 130 Stat. 1401, 
1401 (2016) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45c (2012 & Supp. IV 2016)); N.Y. ARTS 
& CULT. AFF. § 25.24 (McKinney 2017). 
 32 STUBHUB HELP CENTER, https://stubhub.custhelp.com/ (follow “fees”; then 
follow “What are StubHub’s fees to sell tickets?”) [https://perma.cc/QTU4-47C8]; How 
Secondary Market Service Fees Work, SEATGEEK (Mar. 1, 2017), https://seatgeek.com/
tba/articles/secondary-market-service-fees-work/ [https://perma.cc/4VKG-LZ4P] (noting 
that SeatGeek allows, but does not necessarily require sellers to include service fees in 
the listed ticket price); Taylor Mims, StubHub Must Face Lawsuit Over Hidden Fee Drip 
Pricing Allegations, Judge Rules, BILLBOARD (June 13, 2018), https://www.billboard.com/
articles/business/8460853/stubhub-lawsuit-hidden-fee-drip-pricing-allegations [https://
perma.cc/3VMJ-ERU3] (“Only at checkout does StubHub for the first time list a total 
amount that includes hidden fees—after consumers have already selected seats at a lower 
advertised price.”). 
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A. Pre-Bot Legislation 
Being home to Broadway and celebrated venues like 
Madison Square Garden, it comes as no surprise that New York 
has been at the forefront of ticket scalping regulation. First, 
Governor Nathan Miller signed an anti-scalping law in 1922 
that “capped the price of resale tickets at two dollars above face 
value.”33 Governor Miller’s law, which continued to broaden 
throughout the twentieth century, sought to attack what he 
believed was “‘gross profiteering.’”34 Later, legislation was also 
enacted to regulate ticket scalping within a certain distance of 
the venue.35 Additionally, New York State has sought “to police 
out-of-state actors [from scalping] tickets to events within New 
York.”36 As of 2018, all legally operating ticket “resellers” in New 
York are required to have licenses and operate in accordance 
with the State’s ticket resale policies.37 
In 1999, then-Attorney General Elliot Spitzer released a 
report on ticket scalping and how to address the growing 
secondary market.38 Even before bots became the dominant 
mechanism for purchasing tickets it was the Office of the 
Attorney General’s belief that, “the public has virtually no 
opportunity of securing good seats at face value.”39 As of 2018, 
consumers still have to overcome the hurdles of any “illegal 
alliance[s] between [scalpers] and ticket brokers,” as well as 
penetrate the virtual wall in an online sale dominated largely by 
illegal purchasing software.40 
Less than a decade after the 1999 report, New York 
decriminalized ticket scalping with the expectation of being able 
to regulate it.41 The legislation enacted in 2007 sought to address 
 
 33 See OBSTRUCTED VIEW, supra note 1, at 7. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 FAQ—Ticket Reseller, N.Y. DEP’T OF STATE DIV. OF LICENSING SERVS., https://
www.dos.ny.gov/licensing/ticketresell/ticket_faq.html [https://perma.cc/3WN6-AW3A]. State-
sanctioned ticket scalping is referred to as “reselling,” and is permissible with a license. N.Y. 
ARTS & CULT. AFF. § 25.13 (McKinney 2017). 
 38 Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Att’y Gen., Spitzer Issues Report on 
Ticket Sales (May 27, 1999) https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/spitzer-issues-report-ticket-
sales [https://perma.cc/NS2B-6Y3G]. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id.; Rebecca Beitsch, Despite Bans, Ticket-Buying Bots Still Snag the Best 
Seats, PEW STATELINE (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/02/02/despite-bans-ticketbuying-bots-still-snag-the-best-
seats [https://perma.cc/ZN3C-28UB]. 
 41 Anthony J. Dreyer, Hold All Tickets: New York Adopts (Yet Another) Ticket 
Resale Law, 244 No. 19 N.Y. L. J. 1, 1 (July 28, 2010) (The 2007 law “reflected a shift 
toward a more open and expansive market for ticket resale.”); see OBSTRUCTED VIEW, supra 
note 1, at 7. 
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ticket scalping by legalizing the practice in order to create 
legislative oversight on ticket scalping practices.42 The law 
shifted the theme of ticket scalping legislation from 
criminalization of the activity as a whole, to regulation of its 
means.43 Additionally, these laws had the consumer’s interest in 
mind by providing a licensing system that required a licensing fee 
and disclosures of the tickets sold, which is still in effect today.44 
It was clear that the legislature had good faith intentions when 
legalizing ticket resale. While the hope driving its efforts was to 
lower ticket prices for fans, the effect was the opposite. 
In 2010, the New York ticket scalping laws were amended 
to account for the rapid growth of the secondary market, which 
was addressed in the original legislation, and major changes to 
New York’s stance on ticket scalping.45 “[F]or the first time, the 
law banned the use of ticket-buying software . . . . ‘used by 
unscrupulous speculators to purchase tickets at initial sale ahead 
of consumers intending to attend an event . . . .’”46 Since New 
York’s ticket scalping laws contain sunset provisions, the laws are 
often subject to more developments by the legislature.47 
As of 2018, New York’s ticket scalping legislation highlights 
that the state legislature has found that purchasing tickets to 
“places of entertainment are a matter of public interest.”48 
Therefore, preventing the general public from obtaining tickets 
through primary marketers would constitute a violation of that 
interest under federal law, since the BOTS Act provides for action 
when an interest of a state’s residents is threatened by the usage 
of bots.49 Akin to the federal law granting state attorney generals 
the power to bring civil action, the state legislature designates 
the New York Attorney General as the enforcement authority of 
 
 42 See OBSTRUCTED VIEW, supra note 1, at 8. 
 43 Id. (“The operating premise of the 2007 law was not to completely deregulate 
ticket resale, but to legalize it pursuant to regulation and taxation.”). 
 44 Id.; see also N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. § 25.13 (McKinney 2017). 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. (quoting New York State Senate Introducer’s Mem., SB No. 3840-A). The 
legislation that New York enacted in 2010 provided three major changes to legal ticket 
scalping practices in the State. Aside from banning the use of bots, the new legislation 
also mandated that any fees charged by the venue operator and ticket vendors for 
“special services” or convenience changers, must be reasonable. Id. Additionally, the law 
effectively “barred [the use of] non-transferable paperless tickets.” Id. (quoting New York 
State Senate Introducer’s Mem., SB No. 3840-A). 
 47 See OBSTRUCTED VIEW, supra note 1, at 8; David E. Harrington, Uncapping 
Ticket Markets, 33 REGULATION, no. 3, 2010, at 6, 6. 
 48 N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. § 25.01 (McKinney 2017). 
 49 See Better Online Ticket Sales Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-274, § 2(c)(1), 
130 Stat. 1401, 1402 (2016); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. § 25.01 (McKinney 2017). 
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its ticket scalping laws.50 Currently, Article 25 of New York’s 
Arts and Cultural Affairs Law provides that any person or entity 
reselling tickets must refund the purchaser if “the event . . . is 
cancelled,” “the ticket is counterfeit,” or if “the ticket fails to 
conform to its description as advertised unless the buyer has pre-
approved a substation of tickets.”51 Additionally, Article 25 
provides that it is unlawful for any person to utilize automated 
ticket purchasing software, i.e., bots, to purchase tickets and 
that any person who knowingly does so will be subject to a civil 
penalty for each violation.52 
Since the decriminalization of ticket scalping in 2007, the 
focus of New York’s legislation has been to ensure that 
consumers have a fair opportunity to purchase tickets at face 
value. Through purchasing means such as bots, however, ticket 
scalpers have continued to remain at least one step ahead of 
regulations.53 As of June 2018, the state-enacted new legislation 
expanding New York’s ticket scalping regulation.54 The 
amendments require that resale sites post, “in a clear and 
conspicuous manner the total price of the ticket and the portion 
of the ticket price stated in dollars that represents a service 
charge.”55 Thereby, prohibiting ticket websites from deceiving 
customers by “us[ing] a . . . domain name in a ticket website’s URL 
that contains . . . the name of the place of entertainment . . . [or] 
the name of the specific event,” and mandates that online ticket 
scalpers post their license on the ticket resale platform that they 
are using.56 While one proposed version of the bill required the 
 
 50 Better Online Ticket Sales Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-274, § 2(c)(1), 130 
Stat. 1401, 1402 (2016). 
 51 N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. § 25.07 (McKinney 2017). 
 52 N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. § 25.24(3) (McKinney 2017). 
Any person, firm, corporation or other entity who knowingly utilizes ticket 
purchasing software in order to purchase tickets shall be subject to a civil 
penalty in an amount of no less than five hundred dollars and no more than 
one thousand five hundred dollars for each such violation and shall forfeit all 
profits made from the sale of any such unlawfully obtained tickets. 
 53 Leonid Bershidsky, How to End Ticket Scalping, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 9, 2016, 
12:27 PM EST), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-12-09/how-to-end-ticket-
scalping [https://perma.cc/LXT6-VJYZ]. 
 54 Alexis Kramer, New York Cracks Down on Ticket Resale Sites (1), 
BLOOMBERG L. (BNA) (June 20, 2018), https://www.bna.com/new-york-cracks-n73014476725/ 
[https://perma.cc/C5SM-WYA3]. 
 55 2018 McKinney’s Session Law News of N.Y. Ch. 110 (S. 8501-B) (McKinney 
2018); see also Kenneth Lovett, New York Ticket Scalping Law Extended with Consumer 
Protections, DAILY NEWS (July 2, 2018), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/ny-
pol-cuomo-tickets-scalping-20180702-story.html. [https://perma.cc/WD6A-B4HA]. 
 56 2018 McKinney’s Session Law News of N.Y. Ch. 110 (S. 8501-B) (McKinney 
2018); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. § 25.07(4) (McKinney 2018) (requiring ticket resellers to 
disclose service charges “in a clear and conspicuous manner”); N.Y. ART & CULT. AFF. 
§ 25.19 (McKinney 2018) (requiring ticket resellers to post their license “in a conspicuous 
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disclosure of the face value, this provision was not in the final 
version of the bill.57 The passage of this legislation extends 
existing scalping laws through June 30, 2021.58 Despite new anti-
scalping legislation, the brokers who dominate the ticket 
scalping industry continue to do so in a highly sophisticated 
manner, such that it appears that through the use of ticket 
purchasing software, the secondary market has effectively 
gained control of the primary market.59 While the State law has 
short sunset provisions, which are supposed to continue an 
ongoing dialogue about the issue, there has been over a decade’s 
worth of legislation and fans are still forced to rely on the 
secondary market. An ongoing discussion about the subject is a 
step in the right direction, but the ticket brokers have 
progressed in their purchasing mechanisms considerably more 
than the legislation has in combatting them. 
B. The Emergence of Ticket Bots 
The increased secondary market is largely the result of 
ticket-buying bots employed by ticket brokers to circumvent the 
security measures used during online ticket sales.60 “Ticket bots 
are software programs that simulate the action of a human being 
purchasing tickets from an online seller in order to evade control 
measures on the seller’s website.”61 Users of these programs 
often “gain[ ]  unauthorized priority access” to online sales and 
avoid the seller’s quantity limits, thereby purchasing more 
tickets than a consumer not using the software would be able to 
purchase.62 This workaround causes events to be sold out within 
minutes of an online sale, leaving the majority of fans with no 
option but to be victimized by outrageous costs in the secondary 
 
manner”); N.Y. ART & CULT. AFF. § 25.23 (McKinney 2018) (requiring resale sites to post 
that their site is for the secondary sale of a ticket in a “clear and conspicuous” manner); 
N.Y. ART & CULT. AFF. § 25.34 (McKinney 2018) (prohibiting resellers from using domain 
names with the venue or event name in its URL). 
 57 Kenneth Lovett, State Lawmakers to Extend Expiring Ticket-Scalping Law with 
New Consumer Protections, DAILY NEWS (June 17, 2018), http://www.nydailynews.com/
news/politics/ny-pol-ticket-scalping-paperless-stubhub-ticketmaster-springsteen-2018
0617-story.html [https://perma.cc/E9HK-YEH9]; see Silverman, supra note 7. 
 58 Lovett, supra note 57. 
 59 See Silverman, supra note 7. 
 60 See McFadden, supra note 10, at 428; Jason Koebler, The Man Who Broke 
Ticketmaster, MOTHERBOARD (VICE) (Feb. 10, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/
en_us/article/mgxqb8/the-man-who-broke-ticketmaster [https://perma.cc/RY9B-HQPB]. 
(“Any discussion about ticket scalping starts with bots, a mysterious scourge that people 
blame for buying up tickets.”). 
 61 See Kramer, supra note 9, at 184. 
 62 Id. 
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market.63 For example, during U2’s 2014 tour, “a single broker 
purchased 1,012 tickets to one show at Madison Square Garden 
in a single minute, despite the ticket vendor’s claim of a ‘[four] 
ticket limit.’”64 Within one day, that broker and another “had 
together amassed more than 15,000 tickets to U2’s shows across 
North America.”65 At this rate, continued bot usage would render 
an online sale meaningless for the average consumer, as it is 
more likely than not that the secondary market will be their only 
chance of obtaining a seat to the show. 
1. How Bots Access Tickets 
Ticket bots allow brokers to automate searching for and 
buying tickets faster than the average consumer ever could.66 
The bot’s functions are broken down into four parts to allow the 
broker to make up thousands of transactions within the first 
seconds of a venue’s online sale.67 The first functions are known 
as “spinner,” or “drop checker” bots, which monitor sites in 
anticipation of “the release, or ‘drop,’ of tickets.”68 According to 
Ticketmaster, “spinner” bots contribute to nearly ninety percent 
of their site’s traffic.69 Then, the bots’ second function is used to 
“automate the search for and reservation of tickets.”70 While 
even a “skilled human” can get through Ticketmaster’s 
“dropdown prompts” in ten seconds, “spinner” bots enable 
brokers to complete the prompts “in a matter of milliseconds.”71 
Brokers exploit this delayed sale by making multiple near-
instantaneous searches, providing them access to hundreds of 
“reserved” tickets and then allowing the broker to pick the best 
seats.72 Next, the Bot automates the actual purchase of tickets by 
using both real and false names, addresses and credit cards to 
 
 63 Id. 
 64 See OBSTRUCTED VIEW, supra note 1, at 3–4 (emphasis added); see also Ben Sisario, 
Report Exposes Widespread Abuses in Ticketing Industry in New York, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/28/business/media/report-exposes-widespread-abuses-
in-ticketing-industry-in-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/QHU9-3WMZ]. 
 65 See OBSTRUCTED VIEW, supra note 1, at 4. 
 66 Id. at 15. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 See Koebler, supra note 60. 
 72 See OBSTRUCTED VIEW, supra note 1, at 15. When the tickets are released 
on the primary marketer’s site, “sophisticated bots” are used to make thousands of 
requests on the site’s server, which reserve the tickets for the bot user, thereby 
preventing anyone else from purchasing them. Koebler, supra note 60. 
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avoid a promoter’s purchasing limits.73 Scalpers then employ the 
bot to evade and defeat the site’s security measures.74 Additionally, 
some brokers have used “armies of ‘typers,’” which are human 
workers often outsourced from countries with inexpensive labor.75 
Using a ticket bot provides brokers with two ways of 
obtaining tickets that are unavailable to the ordinary consumer: 
avoiding the ticketing site’s security measures and purchasing 
more tickets than the website permits.76 To circumvent the site’s 
security measures, brokers purchase thousands of proxy Internet 
Protocol addresses, which are used to separate each “connection 
attempt” or purchase to give the illusion that these connections 
are being made by multiple users.77 While scalping has been 
customary in the United States for over two hundred years and 
appears to be inevitably impacting any kind of ticketed event, 
bot usage and the ability to quickly buy tickets in mass 
quantities have created a distant gap between the secondary 
ticket market and the state’s ability to regulate ticket scalping.78 
 
 73 Stephen L. Betts, Eric Church Ups War Against Scalpers, Cancels 25,000 
Tickets, ROLLING STONE (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.rollingstone.com/country/news/eric-
church-ups-war-against-scalpers-cancels-25000-tickets-w468077 [https://perma.cc/944N-
U27T]. (Upon canceling ticket purchases country artist Eric Church stated, “[Scalpers] 
buy thousands of tickets across the U.S., not just mine, and then end up making a 
fortune. They use fake credit cards, fake IDs. All of this is fraud.”); Koebler, supra note 
60. (Ticket scalpers evade ticket purchasing limits “by using multiple credit cards with 
multiple addresses”). 
 74 See OBSTRUCTED VIEW, supra note 1, at 16–17 (Brokers have been able to 
effectively “‘train’ their software to ‘read’” CAPTCHA [“Completely Automated Public Turing 
test to tell Computer and Humans Apart”] tests at a faster rate than a human user could.) 
 75 Id. at 17. 
 76 As addressed by the New York State Attorney General, the limits on number of 
tickets purchased applies only per transaction as opposed to per person. Id. at 22. For 
example, in 2015, one bot purchased “520 tickets in [three] minutes” to Beyoncé’s concert at 
the Barclays Center in 2013 and one bot bought “522 tickets in [five] minutes” to a One 
Direction concert at Jones Beach in 2012. Id. at 18. Even after the passage of the BOTS Act, 
fans are still being shut out of high-profile events. See Steven J. Horowitz, The Concert Ticket 
Industry is Still Broken, VULTURE (May 2, 2017), http://www.vulture.com/2017/05/everyone-
wants-concert-tickets-but-no-one-is-getting-them.html [https://perma.cc/H8RJ-2Q7N]. 
 77 See OBSTRUCTED VIEW, supra note 1, at 18. Additionally, bot users register 
thousands of e-mail addresses to falsely make individual purchases that appear to be 
within the site’s purchasing limit. Id. Further, because the bot user is making thousands 
of connections to the ticketing site within a few minutes, the virtual congestion on the 
site prevents actual people from penetrating the server, forcing them out of online sale. 
Id. at 15. (“Ticketmaster has stated that spinners can account for as much as 90% of the 
traffic to its website.”). 
 78 See Lolly Bowean, Chicago’s Hottest Ticket? It’s Michelle Obama’s Book Tour, 
CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 28, 2018, 5:00 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/obamacenter/
ct-met-michelle-obama-book-tickets-20180924-story.html [https://perma.cc/62BB-66PJ] 
(stating that one woman paid $607 on a resale site for two tickets to Michelle Obama’s Book 
Tour in Chicago); Yosemite Battling Pest Problem: Ticket-scalpers, CBS NEWS (Apr. 18, 
2011, 5:31 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/yosemite-battling-pest-problem-ticket-
scalpers/ [https://perma.cc/GAP6-RWYF] (noting that ticket scalpers were selling Yosemite 
National Parks’ “limited camping reservations at exorbitant prices”); see also Parks, 
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The growth of the secondary market has grown out of control and 
the initiatives to combat it have been ineffective against evolving 
ticket purchasing practices. Anti-bot legislation is a step toward 
helping the consumer, but without a proactive approach from 
primary marketers, consumers will continue to be subject to 
unpredictable prices. 
2. Anti-Bot Legislation 
In 2016, President Barack Obama signed the Better 
Online Ticket Sales (BOTS) Act into law by establishing a 
federally backed foundation for regulating ticket scalping.79 
“This [law] attempts to regulate the use of bots to bypass 
security measures on primary ticket marketplace websites.”80 
The Act intends to “prohibit, as an unfair and deceptive act or 
practice in commerce, the sale or use of certain software to 
circumvent control measures used by Internet ticket sellers to 
ensure equitable consumer access to tickets for any given event, 
and to provide criminal penalties for such acts.”81 Specifically, 
the BOTS Act prohibits scalpers from “circumvent[ing] a 
security measure, access[ing] control system, or other 
technological control or measure on an Internet website or online 
service that is used by the ticket issuer to enforce posted event 
ticket purchasing limits or to maintain the integrity of posted 
online purchasing order rules.”82 Under Section two of the Act, it 
is also unlawful “to sell or offer to sell any event ticket” obtained 
through the above stated means.83 Therefore, secondary marketers 
like StubHub would be held liable for allowing brokers to sell 
tickets purchased through ticket bots.84 StubHub and other 
secondary marketers, however, continue to resell tickets without 
 
supra note 21 (“‘Whenever you sell tickets to an event that are printed ahead of time, 
scalping is going to be inevitable.’”). 
 79 Better Online Ticket Sales Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-274, 130 Stat. 1401, 1402 
(2016) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45c (2012 & Supp. IV 2016)); see also Lesley Fair, 
BOTS ACT: That’s the Ticket!, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Apr. 7, 2017, 12:40 PM), https://
www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2017/04/bots-act-thats-ticket [https://perma.cc/
M3U7-CJ97]. 
 80 See McFadden, supra note 10, at 443. 
 81 McFadden, supra note 10, at 443 n.118; see also Better Online Ticket Sales 
Act § 2(a)(1)(A). 
 82 Better Online Ticket Sales Act § 2(a)(1)(A). 
 83 Id. §§ 2(a)(1)(A)–(B). 
 84 The BOTS Act provides a scienter requirement for those that sell tickets 
through the use of bots. Id. at §§ 2(a)(1)(B)(i)–(ii). 
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interruption and generally, federal legislation has yet to deter the 
practices the federal government seeks to penalize.85 
Additionally, New York State criminalized the use of bots 
in 2016.86 This legislation defines “ticket purchasing software,” as 
[A]ny machine, device, computer program or computer software that, 
on its own or with human assistance, bypasses security measures or 
access control systems on a retail ticket purchasing platform, or other 
controls or measures on a retail ticket purchasing platform that assist 
in implementing a limit on the number of tickets that can be 
purchased, to purchase tickets.87 
Pursuant to this law, it is unlawful to sell tickets using 
automated ticket purchasing software and any such sale is 
subjected to a fine.88 Similar to the BOTS Act, the state law 
criminalizes reselling tickets with knowledge that they were 
obtained using ticket purchasing software.89 The new penalties 
that can be administered to bot users and ticket resale sites are 
intended to condemn and deter the use of “manipulat[ive] 
systems designed to limit the number of tickets to an event that 
a person can buy.”90 While this legislation appears to be one step 
of many for the New York State legislature,91 the Attorney General 
has been outspoken on working towards remedying the ticketing 
industry for consumers and identifying the industry’s perpetrators. 
 
 85 Koebler, supra note 60. (“Ticketmaster agrees that anti-bot legislation isn’t 
likely to greatly change bot activity. The company said it blocked [five] billion bot 
attempts in 2015, and that bot activity increased 10[%] between 2015 and 2016.”). 
 86 N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. § 25.24 (McKinney 2016). Upon signing the new 
legislation Governor Andrew Cuomo stated, “These unscrupulous speculators and their 
underhanded tactics have manipulated the marketplace and often leave New Yorkers 
and visitors alike with little choice but to buy tickets on the secondary market at an 
exorbitant mark-up.” Press Release, N.Y. Governor’s Press Office, Governor Cuomo 
Signs Legislation Combating Unfair Ticket Purchasing and Reselling Practices (Nov. 28, 
2016), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-signs-legislation-combating-
unfair-ticket-purchasing-and-reselling-practices [https://perma.cc/QA7J-T4RZ]. 
 87 N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. § 25.24(1) (McKinney 2017). 
 88 Id. § 25.24(3)(a). 
Any person, firm, corporation or other entity who knowingly utilizes 
[automated] ticket purchasing software in order to [bypass security measures] 
to purchase tickets shall be subject to a civil penalty in an amount of no less 
than five hundred dollars and no more than one thousand five hundred dollars 
for each such violation and shall forfeit all profits made from the sale of any 
such unlawfully obtained tickets. 
 89 Compare Better Online Ticket Sales Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-274, 
§ 2(a)(1)(A), 130 Stat. 1401, 1401 (2016) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45c (2012 & 
Supp. IV 2016)) with N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. § 25.24(5) (McKinney 2017) (“Any person, 
firm, corporation or other entity who knowingly resells or offers to resell a ticket that 
such person, firm, corporation or other entity knows was obtained using ticket 
purchasing software and was not obtained for their own use or the use of their invitees, 
employees, or agents shall be subjected to a civil penalty . . . .”). 
 90 N.Y. Governor’s Press Office, supra note 86. 
 91 See Silverman, supra note 7. 
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Consistent with the actions of his predecessors and other 
state leaders, the New York Attorney General published a report 
on the effects of ticket scalping and bot usage in 2016.92 The 
Attorney General found “three brokers using Ticket Bots 
collectively purchased more than 140,000 tickets to events in 
New York over a three-year period between 2012 and 2014.”93 
One issue is that the broker and the resale sites used for resale 
profited from New York venues despite not being licensed 
scalpers under New York law.94 According to the report, 
“[e]vident in the ban on Bots and the legislature’s commentary 
[to the recent amendments] is the idea that ticket buying, when 
presented to the public as a fair contest, should in fact be fair, 
and not subject to manipulation by software or similar 
techniques.”95 Furthermore, if “the [state] legislature prefers” 
that purchasing tickets “be based on [controllable] factors like 
showing up at the right time or simple luck of the draw, as 
opposed to” predatory software, then it must ensure that this goal 
is possible.96 The Attorney General provided recommendations 
that included ensuring compliance from ticket resale platforms, 
increasing transparency in ticket allocations and limits, 
responsibility from primary ticket vendors, and legislative action.97 
Five months after the report’s release, the Attorney General 
announced settlements with six ticket brokers that had 
dominated the secondary market for tickets to events in New 
York.98 These settlement agreements are a step in the right 
 
 92 See OBSTRUCTED VIEW, supra note 1, at 11. This report addresses that the 
majority of tickets to events are not reserved for the general public at the outset. See id. 
at 15. While this is certainly a problem in this industry, it is a separate legal issue and 
will not be addressed in this note. Additionally, in highlighting the unfair practices of 
ticket brokers the Attorney General addressed that a part of the problem is that ticket 
brokers exploit their connections within industry itself to get access to tickets. See id. at 
15; see also Dave Brooks, Scalper Lobbying Group Fires Shot at Ticketmaster in Wake of 
FTC Workshop Announcement, BILLBOARD (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.billboard.com/
articles/business/8478380/scalper-lobbying-group-ticketmaster-ftc-workshop [https://
perma.cc/PC6N-BKTX]. This too is a separate, although important, issue that will not 
be addressed in this note. OBSTRUCTED VIEW, supra note 1 at 11, 15. 
 93 OBSTRUCTED VIEW, supra note 1, at 19. 
 94 N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 25.01 (McKinney 2017) (“The legislature 
objects to any claim that businesses domiciled outside New York state are exempted from 
this statute when selling tickets to events occurring in New York state . . . .”). 
 95 See OBSTRUCTED VIEW, supra note 1, at 8. 
 96 Id. 
 97 See id. at 34–37. 
 98 See infra Section I.B. The companies included Renaissance Ventures, Ebrani 
Corp., Concert Specials Inc., Fanfetch Inc., BMC Capital Partners Inc., and JAL 
Enterprises. Additionally, a seventh company, Componica, LLC was also part of the 
settlement. The company had “developed software libraries used by ticket bots to try to 
get around . . . ‘CAPTCHA’ tests.” In accordance with the settlement, “Componica has 
agreed to not develop or use software to bypass security measures on ticketing websites.” 
Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Att’y Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Announces a $4.19 
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direction toward enforcing and regulating ticket scalping as the 
settlements required that the companies keep their licenses “if 
they [intended] to resell tickets [in] New York . . . abstain from 
using ticket bots, and pay penalties for having operated 
illegally,” which amounted to “$4.19 million in disgorged profits 
and penalties to the State.”99 Since releasing the report, the 
Attorney General’s office has entered into settlement agreements 
with “[fifteen] businesses involved in the illegal ticket trade, 
including resellers, facilitators, and software developers, for a 
total of $7.1 million.”100 The settlements were a response to the 
Attorney General’s call to action against predatory ticket 
scalping, but were made before New York’s amended ticket 
scalping laws took effect.101 
Although the efforts of the state government have yielded 
effective results, these results have only positively impacted the 
state as a whole, while consumers remain subject to high 
secondary prices.102 Similarly, Ticketmaster seeks the same 
injunctive relief and compensatory damages against bot users 
for purchasing thousands of tickets to its events in violation of 
New York law.103 The recent legal actions by the State of New 
York and Ticketmaster demonstrate an interest in repairing the 
 
Million in Settlements With Six Companies That Illegally Purchased and Resold 
Hundreds of Thousands of Tickets to Concerts and Other NY Events (May 11, 2017), 
https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-419-million-settlements-six
-companies-illegally-purchased[https://perma.cc/2735-N52H]. One of these brokers, 
Prestige Entertainment, was the broker that had purchased 1,012 tickets in one minute, 
to the 2014 U2 concert at Madison Square Garden. Id. 
 99 See N.Y. State Office of the Att’y Gen., supra note 98. 
 100 Id. 
 101 See Kathleen McGee & Aaron Chase, Why It’s So Hard to Get a Concert 
Ticket—And What We Can Do About It, MEDIUM: NEW YORK STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
(May 11, 2017), https://medium.com/new-york-state-attorney-general/unrigging-ticketing-
224a5794e6eb [https://perma.cc/248G-249N] (“New York’s legislature enacted new 
legislation . . . adding criminal penalties for bot use to the existing civil penalties. The law 
took effect in February 2017.”). 
 102 See N.Y. State Office of the Att’y Gen., supra note 98. 
 103 See Cara Bayles, Ticketmaster Sues Scalpers For Using Bots To Mass-Buy 
Tix, LAW 360 (Oct. 2, 2017, 8:43 PM EDT), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/970307/ticketmaster-sues-scalpers-for-using-bots-to-
mass-buy-tix [https://perma.cc/RB8B-BCTM] (“Ticketmaster seeks injunctive relief, 
compensatory damages, punitive damages, liquidated damages, disgorgement and 
attorney’s fees and costs.”). Ticketmaster specifically alleged “violations of the federal 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, California’s Computer Data Access and Fraud Act, and 
New York’s Anti-scalping Law.” Complaint at 4, Ticketmaster LLC v. Prestige 
Entertainment Inc., 2:17-cv-07232 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2017), ECF No. 1. The presiding 
judge has since noted that “[t]he bots’ effectiveness is circumstantial evidence 
that . . . the bot developers copied protected portions of the Ticketmaster website and 
mobile app onto its own servers, in order to develop bots that could successfully 
circumvent Ticketmaster’s myriad security measures.” Sophia Morris, Alleged Scalpers 
Must Face Ticketmaster’s Infringement Suit, LAW 360 (May 30, 2018, 5:47 PM EDT), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1048261 [https://perma.cc/BL39-Q9DU]. 
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wrongdoings of scalping in the context of the primary marketer 
and the state venues, but there has yet to be any relief for the 
consumer. Because tickets are a unique good, once they are 
purchased illegally, and then sold for outrageously high prices, 
there is no way to undo the damage.104 The show is over, fans 
have either missed out on an event that they never had a chance 
to attend or overpaid a broker for a ticket with no guarantee that 
it was not counterfeit or duplicated for multiple people. Despite 
the Attorney General’s settlements, the same brokers have 
continued to use illegal ticket purchasing practices.105 Recently, 
Ticketmaster canceled purchases to events when it was known 
that a large portion of the tickets released were purchased using 
bots, and then “put[ ]  the tickets back in the system so fans 
would have a better crack at them.”106 While these isolated 
actions acknowledged the realities of the regular consumer’s 
place in the ticketing industry, it would be impractical for artists 
and primary markets to make it common practice to cancel 
shows each time tickets are purchased using bots.107 
 
 104 As of 2016, tickets to the Broadway play Hamilton were being sold on the 
resale market “for as much as $30,000” per ticket, despite the fact that “the highest 
[price] charged for a Broadway show” is $849 for orchestra seats. See Joanna S. Kao & 
Anna Nicolaou, ‘Hamilton’ Raises Broadway Ticket Prices to Foil Scalpers, FIN. TIMES 
(Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/81e13906-e43b-11e6-8405-9e5580d6e5fb 
[https://perma.cc/3QCF-PYEZ]; see also Gene Maddaus, Ticketmaster Says Bot Army 
Bought 30,000 ‘Hamilton’ Tickets, VARIETY (Oct. 2, 2017, 3:55 PM PT), http://variety.com/
2017/digital/news/ticketmaster-hamilton-prestige-entertainment-renaissance-ventures-
1202578292/ [https://perma.cc/2YFJ-9VZA] (According to a complaint filed by Ticketmaster, 
Prestige Entertainment and its affiliates made 313,528 ticket orders for Hamilton using 
9,047 separate accounts. During the twenty-month time period used to acquire these tickets, 
Prestige purchased “30–40% of the ‘Hamilton’ tickets available through Ticketmaster.”). 
 105 See Bayles, supra note 103. (“In May [2016] . . . Prestige Entertainment, 
agreed to a $3.35 million settlement with the New York Attorney General’s Office to end 
claims it ran ‘one of the largest ticket purchasing and reselling operations in the United 
States’ . . . . The terms of the settlement included an agreement to stop using bots to buy 
tickets, but [Ticketmaster’s] suit alleges Prestige has since breached that agreement.”). 
 106 Kenneth Lovett, Ticketmaster Claims Scalper Used Illegal Bots to Buy 
Thousands of High-Demand Tickets in new $10M Suit, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 2, 2017, 12:00 
PM) http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/ticketmaster-sues-big-time-scalper-10m-
article-1.3536405 [https://perma.cc/XH2Y-6D8M]; see also Michael Paulson & Ben Sisario, 
‘Hamilton’ and ‘Harry Potter’ Productions Try to Outwit Scalpers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/12/theater/hamilton-harry-potter-scalping-
broadway.html [https://perma.cc/A2YL-AC3Q] (“Hamilton” has tried to reduce scalping 
by “canceling suspect purchases.”). These cancellations included purchases from persons 
that exceeded the recently implemented purchasing limits and purchases from people 
hired to stand in line for box office tickets. Michael Paulson, ‘Hamilton’ Takes Steps to 
Limit the Resale of Its Tickets, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
05/14/theater/hamilton-takes-steps-to-limit-the-resale-of-its-tickets.html?smid=pl-share 
[https://perma.cc/PR3D-VS3B]. In response, however, some claim to be unfairly subject to 
the cancellations and lost their tickets. Id. 
 107 In February 2017, country singer Eric Church canceled the sale of more than 
25,000 tickets to his Holdin’ My Own tour, in response to identifying the purchasers of 
those tickets as scalpers. See Betts, supra note 73. Similarly, in 2016 Chance the Rapper 
purchased nearly two thousand floor-seat tickets from scalpers to the Magnificent 
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As the methods of ticket scalping have advanced since the 
early days of Broadway, so have the measures taken in attempt 
to regulate it. With the advent of ticket bots, however, the gap 
between scalpers and lawmakers has grown, and will continue 
to plague consumer interests if left unobstructed. While federal 
and state legislative and enforcement actions have shown a 
great interest in regulating ticket scalping,108 there has yet to be 
relief for the consumers that continue to miss shows due to a 
lack of opportunity. Continued injunctions against brokerage 
firms using illegal means of obtaining tickets will yield positive 
results for the industry, but at a slower rate, and the impact of 
these settlements have failed to instill any deterrence.109 To 
expedite the regulation of ticket scalping, primary marketers 
must change the way they allow their tickets to be sold in order 
to regain control of the expanding secondary ticket market. 
Without further regulation, artists will continue to have large 
profits made off of their work and consumers will become further 
removed from a fair opportunity to purchase tickets at face value. 
II. CONTROLLING THE MARKET THROUGH UNREGULATED 
SECONDARY PRICING 
“The company [Wiseguy] fundamentally broke 
Ticketmaster . . . ”110 
 
The unfortunate reality is that ticket scalpers can charge 
tremendous rates for high profile shows because someone will 
always be willing to pay for them.111 An example of industry 
dominance of this nature was revealed in 2010, when three 
principle owners of Wiseguy Tickets, Inc. (Wiseguy), a ticket 
 
Coloring Day festival and then sold them back to fans at a more reasonable price. See 
Mary J. DeMeglio, Chance the Rapper Fights Scalpers, Fans Win, BILLBOARD (Sept. 12, 2016), 
https://www.billboard.com/articles/news/7503657/chance-rapper-fights-ticket-scalpers-
festival [https://perma.cc/5ER7-A88M]. While the independent efforts of these artists show 
pushback against scalping from the music industry, this is not a sustainable solution. 
 108 See Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Att’y Gen., A.G. Schneiderman 
Proposes Bill to Address Widespread Illegal Use of Software to Purchase Tickets to Concerts 
and Other Events (Apr. 28, 2016), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-proposes-
bill-address-widespread-illegal-use-software-purchase-tickets [https://perma.cc/5QPW-2U9H] 
(The New York Attorney General declared, “[B]y strengthening New York’s anti-ticket bot 
law, this bill will give fans a fairer shot at purchasing tickets to see their favorite 
performers.”); Dan Rys, President Obama Signs Anti-Scalping Bill into Law, BILLBOARD (Dec. 
15, 2016), https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/7625257/president-obama-signs-bots-
act-law [https://perma.cc/W2SX-PMPM]. 
 109 See Bayles, supra note 103. 
 110 Koebler, supra note 60. 
 111 See OBSTRUCTED VIEW, supra note 1, at 4 (“In at least one circumstance, a 
ticket was resold at 7,000% of face value.”) (emphasis added). 
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scalping broker that obtained and resold millions of dollars-
worth of premium tickets, plead guilty to conspiracy to commit 
wire fraud and for violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
by “exceeding authorized access to computers engaged in 
interstate commerce.”112 
The charges against Wiseguy stated that the company 
contributed to a scheme that targeted major primary marketers, 
including Ticketmaster and LiveNation, to “fraudulently 
obtain[ ]  prime tickets to performances by” high-profile artists, 
sporting events, live theatre shows, and special events across the 
United States, including New York.113 Wisguy’s success has been 
categorized as “straight domination” of the ticketing industry,114 
by penetrating ticketing sites’ security measures and extending 
its grasp on the market to almost any type of ticketed event.115 
When U2 had a second sale for tickets to their upcoming tour in 
2005 because Wiseguy had purchased “nearly all of 
the . . . general admission tickets” during the original sale, 
Wiseguy then “took all the good tickets in that second round, 
too.”116 Wiseguy was not alone in their endeavors in the ticketing 
industry and without proper regulations, fans will continue to 
be “le[ft] . . . out in the cold.”117 
Aside from evading online security measures, brokers 
have exploited the public’s interest in wanting to attend high-
profile events. Fans looking to attend these events often “buy 
early in case it will not be available later, and pay a premium to 
 
 112 Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Office, Dist. of N.J., Three Plead Guilty in 
“Wiseguys” Scheme to Purchase 1.5 Million Premium Tickets to Events Through 
Computer Hacking and Fraud (Nov. 18, 2010), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/newark/
press-releases/2010/nk111810.htm [https://perma.cc/775P-TBFW]; see also Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 (1986) (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)). 
 113 U.S. Att’y’s Office, Dist. of N.J, supra note 112. (“The defendants engaged in 
a scheme in which they and their company, Wiseguy Tickets, Inc. (‘Wiseguys’), targeted 
Ticketmaster, Telecharge, Tickets.com, MLB.com, MusicToday, LiveNation, and other 
online ticket vendors. The defendants fraudulently obtained prime tickets to 
performances by, among others: Bruce Springsteen, Hannah Montana, Bon Jovi, 
Barbara Streisand, Billy Joel, and Kenny Chesney. The criminal scheme also targeted 
tickets to live theater, including productions of ‘Wicked’ and ‘The Producers’; sporting 
events, including the 2006 Rose Bowl and 2007 Major League Baseball playoff games at 
Yankee Stadium; and special events—including tapings of the television show Dancing 
with the Stars.”). 
 114 For example, in 2005 Ken Lowson, Wiseguy’s former CEO, “bought nearly 
all of the . . . general admission tickets” available through U2’s fan club for many of their 
shows. Lowson noted, “When the sale dropped, we took 496 in New York, 492 in Boston, 
496 in LA.” Koebler, supra note 60. 
 115 See U.S. Att’y’s Office, Dist. of N.J., supra note 112. 
 116 Koebler, supra note 60 (According to Lowson, Wiseguy bought nearly all of 
the 500 general admission tickets during the original sale, and then bought all of the 
“good tickets” during the second sale.). 
 117 See Bayles, supra note 103. 
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avoid the risk.”118 As a result fans pay well over the ticket’s face 
value because the only tickets available are through the resale 
market when the initial general public sale has sold out.119 The 
New York Attorney General noted that “[i]n at least one 
circumstance, a ticket was resold at 7,000% of face value.”120 
Scalpers have used their ticket purchasing practices to take 
advantage of free or low-priced concerts for charity and to 
deceive fans by selling them tickets that have not actually been 
purchased yet.121 
A. Speculative Ticket Listings 
The secondary market has become the primary medium 
for buying tickets after they are released. As a result of this 
industry dominance, the secondary market has also advertised 
tickets before the primary market has. Fans making these 
purchases, however, were not buying the actual tickets as they 
had not been released yet; instead, these purchases were for 
“speculative tickets.” Speculative listing occurs when secondary 
marketers list tickets for sale before possessing the tickets,122 or 
have a right to sell them.123 In using this practice, ticket scalpers 
“are betting (or speculating) that they will be able to get tickets 
and then resell them.”124 The New York Attorney General has 
pressured secondary resale sites to remove speculative ticket 
 
 118 Alan B. Krueger, Economic Scene; Seven Lessons About Super Bowl Ticket 
Prices, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/01/business/economic
-scene-seven-lessons-about-super-bowl-ticket-prices.html [https://perma.cc/E83G-4758]. 
 119 See Jaskier, supra note 11, at 86 (“Fans can see the drastic price differences 
on secondary market ticketing websites, observing posts for tickets that are selling for 
hundreds of dollars over face value and just went on sale that day.”); see also Sammi 
Elefant, Beyond the Bots: Ticked-Off over Ticket Prices or the Eternal Scamnation?, 25 
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 1, 5 (2018) (“[T]he ticket bots leave the average consumer with no 
other option but to purchase tickets on the secondary market for potentially up to ten 
times face value.”). 
 120 See OBSTRUCTED VIEW, supra note 1, at 4. 
 121 See Stephen Rex Brown, Chuck Schumer, Sandy Victims Rip Shameless 
Scalpers Charging up to $60,000 for Tickets to the 12-12-12 Benefit Concert, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS (Dec. 6, 2012, 2:27 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/chuck-stop-sandy-
scalping-article-1.1214866 [https://perma.cc/SW7R-P2NH]; Rob Davies, Viagogo Condemned 
over Ed Sheeran Cancer Benefit Concert Tickets, GUARDIAN (Feb. 17, 2017, 12:37 PM EST), 
https://www.theguardian.com/money/2017/feb/17/viagogo-condemned-ed-sheeran-cancer-
benefit-concert-tickets-teenage-cancer-trust [https://perma.cc/M2DG-GN47], (Viagogo was 
advertising tickets for Ed Sheeran’s charity gig “for Teenage Cancer Trust for up to £1,750,” 
when the face value of the tickets was only £75); see Sisario, supra note 64. 
 122 What is “Speculative” Ticket Listing?, TICKETMASTER INSIDER (Aug. 15, 
2017), http://insider.ticketmaster.com/spec-ticketing/ [http://perma.cc/7NPS-D3XX]. 
 123 David McCabe, TicketMaster, StubHub Enlisted Ticket Reseller Crackdown, 
THE HILL (May 3, 2016, 11:01 AM EDT), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/278506-
ticketmaster-stubhub-enlisted-to-address-ticket-resellers [http://perma.cc/MHN5-LWWJ]. 
 124 What is “Speculative” Ticket Listing?, supra note 122. 
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listings for concerts, however the illicit practice still continues.125 
In a press release related to the 2016 report, the Attorney 
General stated that speculative listing is the “kind of predatory 
behavior [that] drives up prices, hurts consumers, and sows 
distrust in the ticket industry.”126 For example, tickets for Bruce 
Springsteen’s 2016 tour were listed for more than $5,000 “on 
StubHub and other resale sites” before even going on sale 
through the primary marketer.127 Ticket scalpers use speculative 
ticket postings so that they have the “greatest flexibility” to find 
the most sought after tickets that potential buyers want. 128 
While this practice is readily detectable, as it is obvious when 
tickets are being sold on the resale market before being released 
by the primary marketer, it still remains a factor in the 
secondary ticket market.129 Like other scalping practices, 
“[s]peculative ticket[ing] harm[s] both consumers and the ticket 
industry.”130 For fans, speculative ticket purchases prevent them 
from receiving the seats that they actually paid for, or in the 
worst cases from receiving any tickets at all.131 
By posting speculative ticket listings, many brokers will 
often sell more tickets than the venue has.132 The result is, once 
again, that the consumer must purchase tickets at an outrageous 
price, but without a guarantee of authenticity. Although StubHub 
and other secondary marketers complied with the Attorney 
General’s request to take down speculative ticket listings for the 
2016 Bruce Springsteen tour, the practice continues to plague the 
 
 125 See Sisario, supra note 64. 
 126 Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Att’y Gen., Statement From A.G. 
Schneiderman On Third-Party Ticket Sellers Removing Speculative Concert Ticket 
Listings (Dec. 9, 2015) https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/statement-ag-schneiderman-third-
party-ticket-sellers-removing-speculative-concert [https://perma.cc/GQ9G-5656]); see also 
Ray Waddell, Confessions of a Ticket Scalper: Billboard’s Candid Q&A, BILLBOARD (Mar. 
2, 2012), http://www.billboard.com/articles/news/502937/confessions-of-a-ticket-scalper-
billboards-candid-qa [https://perma.cc/XFU6-9H8X] (Speculative selling “hurts the guy 
who actually owns the inventory, but it’s just like shorting on the stock market—as long as 
they cover, who really cares?”). 
 127 Ben Sisario, New York Looks into ‘Speculative’ Ticket Resellers, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/09/business/media/new-york-looks-into-
speculative-ticket-resellers.html [https://perma.cc/XMR5-KJTL]. In 2015, secondary 
marketers listed tickets to Bruce Springsteen’s 2016 tour for prices up to $5,800. See 
OBSTRUCTED VIEW, supra note 1, at 26. Since the tickets had not been released yet, 
consumers were buying tickets that the brokers “planned, or hoped, to buy later,” with 
no guarantee of receiving what they paid for. Id. 
 128 Here’s How to Identify Counterfeit Tickets, TICKETMASTER INSIDER (Mar. 17, 2014), 
http://insider.ticketmaster.com/concert-counterfeit-tickets/ [https://perma.cc/U7CC-ZY6F]. 
 129 See OBSTRUCTED VIEW, supra note 1, at 26. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id.; see also Waddell, supra note 126 (Selling speculative tickets is “just like 
shorting the stock market—as long as [the seller] cover[s], who really cares?”). 
 132 Id. 
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ticketing industry.133 Additionally, New York State has sought to 
criminalize ticket speculation, but current law permits 
speculative listings provided that the purchaser is informed “in a 
clear and conspicuous manner . . . [that the] ticket reseller does 
not have possession of the ticket.”134 A criminal penalty for ticket 
speculation would continue to support the State’s trend toward 
condemning the predatory practices used by brokers, but would 
still be a reactive measure. Based on the responses to other 
criminal penalties and civil liability imposed on brokers for 
certain scalping practices, it is likely that a criminal penalty for 
ticket speculation would deter brokers from employing the 
practice. Unlike traditional bot purchases and other scalping 
practices, ticket speculation is easier to detect because resale sites 
can see when ticket purchases are made for events that the 
primary marketer has yet to release.135 
B. Profiting from Charity 
Even events that sought to replace profit goals with 
charitable intent or public benefit have had their best wishes 
thwarted by ticket scalpers.136 “[T]he 12-12-12 benefit concert for 
Hurricane Sandy” drew national appeal as some of the world’s 
most recognized performers gathered at Madison Square 
Garden to raise funds for the cause.137 While the 13,500 tickets 
to the show sold out within minutes, days before the show 
hundreds of tickets were being sold through the secondary 
market.138 Tickets were listed on StubHub for up to $48,000 
despite “the highest face value price of a ticket reaching 
$2,500.”139 This was not the only time that scalpers have taken 
advantage of a charity event, but it certainly caused a reaction 
 
 133 Sarah N. Lynch, New York Probes Sale of ‘Speculative’ Bruce Springsteen 
Tickets on StubHub, REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2015, 9:12 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
new-york-probe-springsteen-idUSKBN0TS06W20151209 [https://perma.cc/J74R-9888]; 
see also Horowitz supra note 76 (showing that despite state law, ticket speculation 
continues to be a way of obtaining tickets to events in New York). 
 134 N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. § 25.10 (McKinney 2018). 
 135 Here’s How to Identify Counterfeit Tickets, TICKETMASTER INSIDER (Mar. 17, 
2014), http://insider.ticketmaster.com/concert-counterfeit-tickets/ [https://perma.cc/2H82-
MWPL] (“If an event has not gone on sale yet to the general public, but seats are already 
being sold, that is a good indication that they are ‘spec’ [speculative] tickets.”). 
 136 See OBSTRUCTED VIEW, supra note 1, at 4. 
 137 See McKinley, supra note 2. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Madeline Boardman, 12-12-12 Scalpers: Benefit Concert Fights Against 
Reselling of Tickets, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 8, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/12/08/12-12-12-scalpers-benefit-concert-reselling-tickets_n_2263799.html [https://
perma.cc/UE7K-AY39]. 
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that woke up the New York State legislature.140 When Pope 
Francis visited New York in 2015, the tickets, which were free 
at face value, rose to thousands of dollars.141 “Even those who 
intend their events to be free . . . find their good intent defeated 
by those who resell tickets for hundreds or even thousands of 
dollars,” demonstrating scalping’s viral effect on the ticketing 
industry, impacting both fans and artists.142 
III. THE INDUSTRY STRIKES BACK—PRIMARY SELLERS AND 
ARTISTS COMBAT BOT USAGE 
“I think [ticket scalping is] extortionate and I think it’s 
disgraceful.”—Sir Elton John143 
 
The pricing scheme for selling tickets in the primary 
market is calculated unlike that of other goods because the value 
of tickets is dependent on a variety of factors including the 
artist’s popularity, venue size, and seat location, thereby making 
tickets a “heterogeneous commodit[y].”144 Ticket sales are unique 
in that they are driven by the intent to build a relationship 
between the consumer, the artists, and the venue.145 As a result, 
tickets are often sold at a face value “for less than the highest 
price the market can stand.”146 While some have suggested that 
 
 140 See Press Release, N.Y. State Sen. Daniel L. Squadron, Squadron 
Legislation Would Protect Consumers, Make Illegal Reselling Charity Event Tickets For 
More Than Face Value (Dec. 12, 2012), https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/press-
releases/daniel-l-squadron/squadron-announces-legislation-ban-resale-charity-tickets 
[https://perma.cc/5UPC-59WK]. 
 141 See Spector, supra note 5. 
 142 See OBSTRUCTED VIEW, supra note 1, at 4. 
 143 Id.at 3 (citing Mark Savage, Sir Elton John: Secondary Ticket Prices 
Disgraceful, BBC NEWS (Dec. 16, 2015) http://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-
35091230/ [https://perma.cc/93DB-JB3Z]). 
 144 Scott D. Simon, Note, If You Can’t Beat ’Em, Join ’Em: Implications for New 
York’s Scalping Law in Light of Recent Developments in the Ticket Business, 72 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1171, 1177 (2004); see also Eric Schroeder et al., A Brief Overview on Ticket 
Scalping Laws, Secondary Ticket Markets, and the StubHub Effect, 30 ENT. & SPORTS 
LAW. 1, 1 (2012); OBSTRUCTED VIEW, supra note 1, at 4. (“Whereas many areas of the 
economy the arrival of the Internet and online sales has yielded lower prices and greater 
transparency, event ticketing is the great exception.”). 
 145 Jacob Goldstein, Ticketmaster to Scalp its Own Tickets, NPR (Apr. 20, 2011, 
11:54 AM ET), http://www.npr.org/sections/money/2011/04/20/135568378/ticketmaster-
to-scalp-its-own-tickets [https://perma.cc/9K5T-6E5R]. (“A concert ticket isn’t a cold, 
calculated exchange between two people who are never going to interact again. It’s one 
transaction in what is typically [a] long-term commercial relationship between the 
musician and the fan.”). 
 146 Schroeder et al., supra note 144; Goldstein, supra note 145 (“[I]n the long-
term, it may be in the musician’s economic interest to sell tickets at a price that’s lower 
than the absolute maximum the market will bear . . . . That way, fans still have warm, 
fuzzy feelings about the musician—and keep coming back for more.”). 
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this arrangement is the very cause of the resale industry,147 
primary marketers continue to do this in order “to have 
consistent sellouts [and] develop a sustainable fan base.”148 The 
entertainment industry is unique in that promoters are not 
reliant on single-event sales, but rather look to encourage regular 
customers, i.e., a consistent fan base, willing to return to the 
venue for future shows.149 Promoters and venues keep prices at a 
more reasonable rate for consumers in order sell to as many 
people as possible, expecting to profit again from the venue’s food 
and drink vendors.150 Additionally, a sold out show reflects well 
on artists and allows them to elevate their credibility.151 If ticket 
scalpers continue to purchase tickets to these events in large 
quantities and sell them at an inflated rate, the likelihood of sold 
out shows decreases and chances of a consistent fan base 
disappear. While support from lawmakers has been helpful in 
gaining traction against the secondary market, artists and 
primary ticket sellers have also united to condemn the activity 
through independent means.152 
A. Ticketmaster’s Initiatives and Shortcomings 
In response to the use of bots and the growing secondary 
market, Ticketmaster has tried several alternative means for 
selling their tickets in an attempt to ensure that fans have an 
opportunity to buy tickets at face value. In 2011, Ticketmaster 
introduced “dynamic pricing,” which came a year after ticket 
sales drastically declined.153 The program allowed prices to drop 
for events that had many unpurchased tickets, thereby creating 
 
 147 Goldstein, supra note 145 (“When scalpers are re-selling tickets at inflated 
prices, it means the initial price is too low.”). 
 148 Schroeder et al., supra note 144; see also See Jaskier, supra note 11, at 85 
(“Numerous parties are involved in setting ticket prices for concerts, but promoters and 
artists have good reasons for setting them low.”); Simon, supra note 144. (“Basic 
microeconomic theory posits that when sellers offer goods at lower prices, demand will 
be higher and more goods will be sold.”). 
 149 Simon, supra note 144. 
 150 See Jaskier, supra note 11, at 85; Simon, supra note 144 (“[P]romoters’ ancillary 
revenue streams, such as souvenirs, concessions, broadcast rights and parking should also be 
considered part of the ticket-pricing equation. For instance, promoters earn more from 
expensive soda, hot dogs, and beer than they do from tickets.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 151 See Jaskier, supra note 11, at 85. 
 152 Summer 2017 Litigation Update, ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees—Update, 
33 ENT. & SPORTS L. 29, 40 (“Without the help of technological defenses, artists and vendors 
have had to come up with other solutions to stem the tide of bots and scalpers.”). 
 153 Alex Pham, Ticketmaster Moving to Flexible Ticket Pricing, L.A. TIMES: COMPANY 
TOWN BLOG (Apr. 18, 2011, 2:55 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/entertainmentnews
buzz/2011/04/ticketmaster-moves-to-flexible-pricing.html [https://perma.cc/B26B-CK6G]. 
“Ticketmaster is not the first company to explore dynamic ticket pricing.” Id. Scorebig, an 
online market place for ticket sales, also launched a similar initiative. Id. 
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more opportunities for fans to see shows at affordable rates and 
for artists to develop a larger fan base.154 In 2018, Ticketmaster 
seemed to have brought back a dynamic pricing platform, 
labeling it as “Official Platinum Seats.”155 Though viewed as a 
way to combat scalpers, the initiative received mixed reviews 
from artists and “left . . . fans confused,” wondering why “they’re 
asked to pay hundreds of dollars more than [the ticket’s] face 
value.”156 While this may have been a step in the right direction, 
it was a small one at best as the secondary market has continued 
to grow exponentially into an $8 billion industry.157 
Another measure that Ticketmaster tried was “TM+,” an 
internal resale site that allowed “fans [to] mak[e] deals with 
each other, with Ticketmaster as the middleman.”158 While some 
bands like Depeche Mode supported this initiative and believed 
it to be a safer way of selling tickets, others refused to subscribe 
as they saw the TM+ initiative as a way for Ticketmaster to 
profit off of the secondary market rather than helping fans.159 
Ticketmaster has since implemented this system in the United 
Kingdom in August 2018, with its “fan-to-fan ticket exchange.”160 
Ticketmaster’s entry into the secondary market is by no means 
a solution because there is no requirement that its tickets can 
only be sold through its resale platform.161 “Whether 
Ticketmaster does it or doesn’t do it, it’s out there on other sites,” 
and scalpers will have other platforms that they can sell their 
tickets on without being subjected Ticketmaster’s regulations.162 
 
 154 Id. (According to Ticketmaster Chief Executive Nathan Hubbard, “By 
utilizing MarketShare and Ticketmaster’s technology, our clients will be able to retain 
economic value that is normally siphoned off by the secondary market, and to sell more 
of their tickets that go unsold today. Meanwhile, more fans will have more opportunities 
to enjoy live entertainment events because tickets will be more accessible and pricing 
options will broaden.”). 
 155 Steve Knopper, Taylor Swift’s Ticket Strategy: Brilliant Business or Slowing 
Demand?, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 9, 2018, 2:59 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/
music-news/taylor-swifts-ticket-strategy-brilliant-business-or-slowing-demand-630218/ 
[https://perma.cc/48V9-FVB]. 
 156 Id. (“Basically, Ticketmaster is operating as StubHub.”). 
 157 Roger Tomlinson, Ticketmaster Adopts Dynamic Pricing, TICKETING INST. 
(Apr. 23, 2011), http://theticketinginstitute.com/ticketmaster-adopts-dynamic-pricing/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y8XB-G6UG]; see Sisario, supra note 12. 
 158 Steve Knopper, Inside Ticketmaster’s New Scalping Plan, ROLLING STONE 
(Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/inside-ticketmasters-new-
scalping-plan-20130913 [https://perma.cc/48V9-FVB]. 
 159 Id.; Knopper, supra note 17. 
 160 Marc Schneider, Ticketmaster Shutting Down Controversial Resale Sites 
GET ME IN! and Seatwave, BILLBOARD (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.billboard.com/
articles/business/8469785/ticketmaster-shutting-get-me-in-seatwave-secondary-ticketing 
[https://perma.cc/6FJ8-6GTS] 
 161 See Knopper, supra note 17. 
 162 Id. 
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 Introduced in 2017, Ticketmaster has used its “Verified 
Fan” Program as a means of controlling who can buy its tickets 
during online sales.163 This program allows fans to register with 
the program before tickets are released and then those who 
Ticketmaster deems “verified,” receive a code that enables them 
the seemingly exclusive opportunity to purchase tickets to the 
event.164 According to Ticketmaster, “[t]he system aims to thwart 
bad actors who are in the business of taking away tickets from 
fans just so they can resell them.”165 As a result of its success, 
Ticketmaster used the Verified Fan Program for the first time 
on an arena tour for U2’s 2018 tour.166 Ticketmaster claims that 
this program is successful because fans register with the program 
“two to three weeks before tickets go on sale,” giving Ticketmaster 
an opportunity “to weed out any bad actors and know exactly how 
many people want to buy tickets.”167 This program, however, has 
still not completely insulated Ticketmaster from scalpers. In 
response to the Verified Fan program, scalpers are now buying 
and selling the codes that allow fans to access tickets through 
Ticketmaster’s program, at tremendous costs.168 
Despite its efforts, part of Ticketmaster’s ticket purchasing 
system have been subject to abuse by brokers and bot users. While 
Ticketmaster and other primary marketers have levied limits on 
the number of tickets purchased per-transaction, there has been 
no limit placed on the number of transactions that individual 
can make.169 By the current standards, one person could 
purchase the maximum number of tickets within the limit, and 
then make continuous transactions technically still within the 
limit.170 Although holding ticketing websites accountable will not 
outlaw bot usage, it will at least add an extra hurdle.171 
Ticketmaster’s initiatives to combat scalping may portray it as 
wanting fans to buy tickets at face value, yet there remains a lack 
of transparency between the number of tickets “listed” and those 
 
 163 Verified Fan, TICKETMASTER, http://help.ticketmaster.com/verified-fan/ 
[https://perma.cc/77SQ-QGWP]. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Dave Brooks, U2 Becomes First Band to Use ‘Verified Fan’ for All Tickets on an 
Arena Tour, BILLBOARD (Nov. 2, 2017), http://www.billboard.com/articles/business/8022362/
u2-ticketmaster-verified-fan-all-tickets-arena-tour [https://perma.cc/9DLW-64NS]. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Anne Steele, Ticketmaster Tries to Weed Out Scalpers, and a New Market is 
Born, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16, 2017, 8:00 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
ticketmaster-tries-to-weed-out-scalpers-and-a-new-market-is-born-1505563201 [https://
perma.cc/8SKH-VELY]. 
 169 See OBSTRUCTED VIEW, supra note 1, at 22. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. at 5–6 (listing mandatory compliance as only one recommendation 
among several). 
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tickets that are actually available.172 Further, Ticketmaster has 
been found to be working with the ticket scalpers in some 
capacity.173 According to Ticketmaster’s own representatives, the 
company “turns a blind eye to scalpers who use ticket-buying bots 
and fake identities to snatch up tickets.”174 While company 
executives have since dismissed these claims,175 there is now an 
even greater need for transparency. As the Attorney General 
noted, if there is any chance of regaining control of the resale 
market, primary sellers must be upfront about their practices.176 
B. Artists Respond to Ticket Scalping and Bot Usage 
It has been readily apparent that scalping has a 
devastating effect on artists, as well as their fans. During a 
Grammy award speech in 2005, rather than promoting his 
band’s upcoming tour, U2 drummer Larry Mullen, Jr. delivered 
an apology.177 Beside himself, Mullen addressed the crowd 
stating: “Due to circumstances beyond our control, a lot of our 
long-suffering fans didn’t get tickets [to U2’s upcoming Vertigo 
tour]. And I’d like to take this opportunity on behalf of the band 
to apologize for that.”178 For an upcoming artist, their success can 
be contingent on establishing a recurring fan base, while more 
established performers seek to maintain that fan base through 
the duration of their career. Even established indie artists, “like 
Father John Misty [are] very ticket-price-conscious.”179 As 
Mullen later noted in an interview, “when something like tickets 
go astray, and people wait online for hours, and they don’t get 
the seats they, or they don’t get seats at all, it’s hard for 
us . . . . it’s personal.”180 If an artist’s die-hard fans are priced out 
of attending shows due to illegal ticket scalping, however, the 
 
 172 See McFadden, supra note 10, at 433 (“[N]ot all tickets will be open for sale 
to the general public. Some of the best seats are withheld for certain parties.” (footnotes 
omitted)) Promoters determine what tickets are available to the general public at the 
online sale, and which tickets are held back for certain groups. Id. at 433 n.40. 
 173 Dave Seglins, et al., ‘A Public Relations Nightmare’: Ticketmaster Recruits 
Pros for Secret Scalper Program, CBC (Sept. 19, 2018, 4:00 AM ET), https://www.cbc.ca/
news/business/ticketmaster-resellers-las-vegas-1.4828535 [https://perma.cc/7Q6V-52MT]. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Dave Brooks, Ticket Master President Talks TradeDesk Scandal, BILLBOARD 
(Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/8476697/ticketmaster-
president-tradedesk-scandal-exclusive-interview [https://perma.cc/GNP7-BRDC]. 
 176 See OBSTRUCTED VIEW, supra note 1, at 5. 
 177 Koebler, supra note 60. 
 178 Id. 
 179 See Knopper, supra note 155. 
 180 MTV News Staff, U2 Working on How to Dismantle A Ticket-Scalping Bomb, 
MTV NEWS (Feb. 16, 2005), http://www.mtv.com/news/1497040/u2-working-on-how-to-
dismantle-a-ticket-scalping-bomb/ [https://perma.cc/BN5D-98FF]. 
2018] A FIXED GAME 285 
artist loses the opportunity to build-upon or maintain the loyalty 
of those fans.181 
In 2011, the U.K. Association of Independent Festivals 
and Sandbag—a merchandise and e-commerce company—
established the Ticket Trust to provide a secure and ethical 
ticketing option for fans.182 During their 2012 United Kingdom 
tour, Radiohead “pledged that any tickets sold through” an 
online site of theirs would only be “exchangeable for face value 
via the Ticket Trust.”183 Radiohead’s announcement brought 
hope for the music industry following the release of a 
documentary detailing the secondary ticket market and how 
major tour promoters like Live Nation “automatically place large 
numbers of tickets directly onto [resale] sites.”184 In 2016, the 
FanFair Alliance was founded by music managers and 
businesses in 2016, to unite artists and take a stand against 
ticket scalping.185 The organization aims to bring artists, 
entrepreneurs, consumers and lawmakers together “to curb[ ]  
industry-scale touting in the secondary ticketing market.”186 The 
FanFair Alliance outlined tips for artists and businesses to use 
to beat scalpers that included: printing the name of the original 
buyer on tickets, limiting the number of tickets sold per person, 
working with an ethical ticket exchange, and informing fans.187 
 
 181 Artist responding to ticket scalping themselves is nothing new. At one point, 
the Grateful Dead “required fans to express their interest in a ticket via a postcard, 
which the band then selected in a lottery.” Anna Nicolaou & Fan Fei, Taylor Swift Hits 
High Note in Battle Against Ticket Touts, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.ft.com/
content/138fb9fa-cc1a-11e8-b276-b9069bde0956 [https://perma.cc/S6KR-GWS9]. 
 182 Richard Smirke, Radiohead Sidesteps Secondary Ticket Market, Partners 
With Fan-to-Fan Ticket Trust for U.K. Tour, BILLBOARD (Feb. 29, 2012, 7:00 PM EST), 
http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/touring/1098645/radiohead-sidesteps-
secondary-ticket-market-partners-with-fan-to [https://perma.cc/Y9RQ-4WHJ]. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. 
 185 About the FanFair Alliance, FANFAIR ALLIANCE, http://fanfairalliance.org/
about/ [https://perma.cc/D794-RKJT]. 
 186 Id. 
 187 MUSIC MANAGERS FORUM & FANFAIR ALLIANCE, #TOUTSOUT—A GUIDE 
FOR MUSIC MANAGERS AND ARTISTS TO TACKLE ONLINE TICKET TOUTING 6–7 (2016) 
http://fanfairalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/FanFair_Toutsout_A-Guide-to-
fighting-ticket-touting-MMF.pdf [https://perma.cc/D794-RKJT]. SongKick is another 
“independent artist-ticketing service” that allows artists “to take control of their ticket 
[sales]” and is “used by [popular] artists like Adele, Jack Johnson and Metallica.” 
Summer 2017 Litigation Update, supra note 152. In 2015, through Songkick, Adele 
successfully blocked “approximately 53,000 [ticket] sales to [purchasers] who were 
determined ‘known or likely’ scalpers (possibly determined by the quantity of tickets 
people were trying to buy).” Adrienne Green, Adele Versus the Scalpers, ATLANTIC (Dec. 
21, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/12/adele-scalpers/421362/ 
[https://perma.cc/KZW4-SBG6]. It is estimated that by using Songkick Adele’s fans have 
been spared roughly “$6.5 million in elevated resale ticket prices.” Id. Recently, the 
European ticket platform, Twicketts has partnered with Naill Horan of One Direction, 
and other musicians during their United States tour. Associated Press, Twickets 
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These initiatives are steps in the right direction, but greater 
transparency is needed from other industry actors. The three 
major actors in the primary ticket market—the artist, the 
primary seller, and the state legislature—need to be on the same 
page on how to address ticket scalping if there is going to be any 
chance of controlling the secondary market.188 
C. The Paperless Ticket Problem 
Tickets are on their way to becoming an entirely non-
tangible good. One of the Attorney General’s recommendations 
was to put an end to New York State’s “de facto ban on [non-
transferrable] paperless tickets.”189 Ticketmaster developed its 
Paperless Ticket system to “ensure[ ]  that only fans can 
purchase tickets and attend the event.”190 Instead of presenting a 
traditional paper or electronic ticket, fans simply “show up at the 
[event] with an ID and the credit card they used for purchase,” 
thereby, requiring the original purchaser to be present for the 
event.191 New York law prohibits primary marketers from 
“employ[ing] a paperless ticketing system unless the consumer is 
given an option to purchase paperless tickets that the consumer 
 
Launches Face Value-Based Ticket Platform in US, BILLBOARD (Oct. 11, 2017), 
https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/7997447/twickets-tickets-resale-us-launch 
[https://perma.cc/AHH9-TPVB]. According to its founder, the platform is looking to 
expand into sporting events and has already saved fans over $20 million in ticket prices 
in the United Kingdom. Id. 
 188 In 2016, Chance the Rapper “purchased nearly two thousand tickets” to the 
[Magnificent Coloring Day] [F]estival to give to fans, in response to seeing high resale 
prices for his performance. John Lynch, Chance the Rapper Bought Almost 2,000 Scalper 
to His Own Festival to Re-sell to Fans, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 9, 2016, 11:59 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/chance-the-rapper-buys-scalper-tickets-to-his-festival-
sells-to-fans-2016-9 [https://perma.cc/5ER7-A88M]. LCD Soundsystem also took action 
against ticket scalpers, by adding more shows to what was to be their final tour in 2011. 
Will Caiger-Smith, How New Scalping Technology is Keeping You Out of Concerts, VICE 
(June 9, 2016, 6:20 PM), https://thump.vice.com/en_us/article/ae8j4z/ticket-scalping-
new-technology [https://perma.cc/CU6Z-DKGD]; Devon Ivie, LCD Soundsystem Is 
Investigating How Many Bots Bought Tickets to Their Sold-out NYC Shows, VULTURE 
(Mar. 30, 2017), http://www.vulture.com/2017/03/lcd-soundsystem-is-investigating-
concert-ticket-bot-problem.html [https://perma.cc/8B7Z-JYJW]. Further, Pearl Jam’s 
unavailing feud with Ticketmaster is a prime example that an artist trying to work without 
it selling their tickets is untenable. Eric Boehlert, Pearl Jam: Taking on Ticketmaster, 
ROLLING STONE (Dec. 28, 1995, 5:00 PM ET), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-
news/pearl-jam-taking-on-ticketmaster-67440/ [https://perma.cc/A5ET-7UCH]; see also 
Dave Brooks, Is Pearl Jam’s Beef with Ticketmaster Officially Squashed?, BILLBOARD (Jan. 
26, 2018), https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/8096339/pearl-jam-feud-ticket
master-over-verified-fan-platform-tour [https://perma.cc/A7TT-CEZC]. 
 189 See OBSTRUCTED VIEW, supra note 1, at 6. 
 190 “Paperless Ticket” FAQs, TICKETMASTER, http://www.ticketmaster.com/miley
cyrus/faq.html [https://perma.cc/NF67-DJ3A]. 
 191 Gordon Cox, ‘Hamilton,’ Broadway and the Duel Over Paperless Tickets, 
VARIETY (Jan. 2, 2018, 4:00 AM PT), https://variety.com/2018/voices/columns/hamilton-
tickets-west-end-broadway-1202650191/. [https://perma.cc/P5H3-L89V]. 
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can transfer at any price, at any time, and without additional 
fees.”192 While opponents of nontransferable paperless tickets 
argue that it allows for consumer choice and encourages open 
market, this law does nothing to combat scalping because the easily 
transferable paperless tickets can be used, they just cannot be the 
only ticket option.193 
Ticketmaster has used its non-transferable paperless 
tickets system to prevent brokers from selling multiple copies of the 
same electronic PDF ticket or “reissued tickets with new 
barcodes.”194 Under the current New York law, however, brokers 
can still request transferable tickets, thereby making 
Ticketmaster’s intentions futile.195 While the Attorney General has 
sought to repeal the “de facto ban” for this reason, the paperless 
ticket system is still not impervious to ticket scalping.196 For 
example, Ken Lowson of Wiseguy adapted to Ticketmaster’s 
paperless initiative by asking for its customers’ credit card 
information so that the paperless ticket would be bought “directly 
on [their] credit cards.”197 
The paperless ticket system may actually create more ticket 
scalping because while smaller level scalpers are unable to 
circumvent the credit card requirement, larger brokers are able to 
capitalize on the diminished competition.198 For instance, Lowson 
also admitted that he “considered opening a bank in the Cayman 
Island to issue his own disposable credit cards.”199 Therefore, while 
Ticketmaster and some of the prominent artists that use its 
paperless ticket system believe it to be effective because of the mere 
inconvenience created for brokers, the reality is that non-
transferable paperless tickets create further headaches for fans 
who may not be able to use a ticket that they originally purchased. 
Additionally, by only using this system for high-profile events, 
Ticketmaster further inflates the value of these tickets, thereby 
creating an incentive for brokers to purchase them for resale.200 
 
 192 N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. § 25.30(1)(c) (McKinney 2017). 
 193 See Elefant, supra note 119. 
 194 See Here’s How to Identify Counterfeit Tickets, TICKETMASTER INSIDER (Mar. 
17, 2014), http://insider.ticketmaster.com/concert-counterfeit-tickets/ [https://perma.cc/
U7CC-ZY6F]; OBSTRUCTED VIEW, supra note 1, at 36. 
 195 See OBSTRUCTED VIEW, supra note 1, at 36. 
 196 Koebler, supra note 60. (Paperless tickets “make[ ]  scalpers’ lives much 
harder but [are] regularly circumvented by the most serious operations.”). 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. 
 200 See OBSTRUCTED VIEW, supra note 1, at 36. 
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IV. CHANGING THE DIRECTION OF THE TICKET INDUSTRY’S 
REGULATORY CLIMATE 
“Many tickets on secondary sites are being sold by touts 
who are simply in the business of ripping off the fan by 
charging an extortionate amount for sold out shows.”—
Mumford & Sons201 
 
The reactive nature of anti-scalping laws has been the 
common theme of nearly two centuries of regulation. The laws set 
forth at the state and federal level have ineffectively aimed at 
restricting ticket scalping, condemning third-party vendors, and 
criminalizing the use of bots, though enforcement of these laws 
appears to be limited.202 Even in the cases where bot users have 
been brought to justice, the damage has already been done.203 In 
order to protect consumers from losing tickets to bots and artists 
having scalpers wrongfully profit off their performances, proactive 
measures must be put in place. To ensure these protections, the 
primary ticket marketers must be held accountable for whose 
hands its tickets are in. 
Existing ticket scalping regulations are problematic 
because they address how tickets are resold, instead of the initial 
ticket sale.204 Preventing the scalper from committing the acts 
that the federal government and state legislature have already 
found to be illegal requires action before the ticket leaves the 
primary marketer. While it has been argued that the absence of 
a secondary resale market would still leave many fans unable to 
purchase tickets, these arguments lack perspective on the 
current state of the secondary ticket market.205 The supply versus 
demand narrative will always exist for fans and “[t]he problem is  
 201 Mumford & Sons Join the Fight Against the Ticket Touts, GUARDIAN (Dec. 
16, 2015, 5:16 AM EST), https://www.theguardian.com/music/2015/dec/16/mumford-
sons-join-the-fight-against-the-ticket-touts [https://perma.cc/2CFX-7YUP]. 
 202 Hayley C. Cuccinello, Brokers, Bots And Insiders: Why ‘The Average Fan Has 
No Chance to Buy Tickets At Face Value’ (Jan. 29, 2016, 2:53 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/hayleycuccinello/2016/01/29/brokers-bots-insiders-why-the-average-fan-has-no-chance-
to-buy-tickets-at-face-value/#6bab03356be6 [https://perma.cc/76NJ-PU55]. (“Brokers have 
technology and lax enforcement on their side.”); Seabrook, supra note 19 (“[E]ventually 
laws were put in place that prohibited scalping within a certain distance of a venue. But, 
as anyone who has been to a big game or a show at Madison Square Garden knows, such 
laws are rarely enforced.”). 
 203 See U.S. Att’y’s Office, Dist. of N.J., supra note 112. 
 204 Both the federal and New York law aim to police ticket scalping and impose 
penalties for certain tactics, but neither address protecting fans in the initial sale. See 
Better Online Ticket Sales Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-274, 130 Stat. 1401, 1401 (2016) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45c (2012 & Supp. IV 2016)); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. 
§ 25.24 (McKinney 2017). 
 205 See Simon, supra note 144, at 1175 (arguing that “far from posing a threat 
to society, the existence of the secondary ticket market benefits consumers.”). 
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not simply that demand for prime seats exceeds supply.”206 The 
issue for consumers, artists, and primary marketers is the gap 
between how scalpers sell and obtain tickets and the legislature’s 
ability to regulate those transactions, once the primary marketer 
has released the tickets. This is not to say that ticket resale should 
be prohibited all together. Such a solution would be unrealistic and 
subject venues and promoters to the same issues that they face 
with the current secondary market. 
A. Addressing the Secondary Market 
The BOTS Act grants state attorneys general the power 
to bring civil actions when there is “reason to believe that an 
interest of the residents of the State ha[ve] been . . . threatened 
or adversely affected by . . . a practice that violates” the Act.207 
While the Attorney General has successfully obtained some form 
of compliance from secondary marketers in the past, even 
multimillion dollar settlements against them do not seem to be 
enough to thwart ticket scalping brokers.208 The secondary 
marketers’ compliance, however, was narrowly applied and 
quickly disregarded.209 In order to fully protect consumers and 
artists, New York State must take action to prevent secondary 
marketers from providing scalpers with a reliable platform to 
sell illicitly obtained tickets. This would require the Attorney 
General to seek to enjoin secondary marketers from allowing bot 
users to exploit their services as a resale platform. 
The Attorney General must use this enforcement power on 
secondary marketers, in accordance with the BOTS Act and New 
York Arts and Cultural Affairs Law, to subject ticket resale 
companies to a civil penalty for allowing scalpers to sell tickets 
that were “obtained using ticket purchasing software.”210 This 
action would incentivize secondary marketers to vet the 
 
 206 See OBSTRUCTED VIEW, supra note 1, at 3. 
 207 Section 2(c)(1) of the Bots Act of 2016 provides, 
In any case in which the attorney general of a State has reason to believe that 
an interest of the residents of the State has been or is threatened or adversely 
affected by the engagement of any person subject to subsection (a) in a practice 
that violates such subsection, the attorney general of the State may, as parens 
patriae, bring a civil action on behalf of the residents of the State in an 
appropriate district Court of the United States. 
Better Online Ticket Sales Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-274, § 2(c)(1), 130 Stat. 1401, 
1402 (2016) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45c (2012 & Supp. IV 2016)). 
 208 See N.Y. State Office of the Att’y Gen., supra note 98. 
 209 See Section II.A. 
 210 Better Online Ticket Sales Act § 2 (c)(1); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. § 25.24(5) 
(McKinney 2017). 
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companies that use their services to ensure compliance with state 
and federal law. Since the Act provides that the “attorney general 
of a state” may bring civil action to enjoin the aforementioned 
corporation from further violation, as well as to compel compliance 
and obtain damages, there is an opportunity to deter secondary 
marketers from providing their services to incompliant ticket 
scalpers.211 While it could be argued that scalpers will work their 
way around this initiative, just as they have done with other failed 
initiatives, holding the secondary marketer legally accountable for 
those who use its website would incentivize companies like 
StubHub to remove themselves from any association they may 
have with ticket brokers that are known or likely to use bots when 
purchasing tickets.212 
This secondary marketer accountability would benefit 
consumers because it would diminish the scalper’s opportunities 
to sell their illegally obtained product, thereby making the 
practice less profitable. The primary ticketing market would 
benefit because there would be greater control over reselling 
tickets, promoting the use of the primary marketer’s own resale 
site.213 Additionally, the artist would benefit because millions of 
dollars in profit that only the broker and resale site gained, 
would no longer be generated off of their work. 
While consumers lose the opportunity to see their 
favorite artists perform or at least pay face value for the tickets, 
secondary marketers respond by endorsing their notion of an 
open market.214 Since “[t]ickets hold a certain market value 
[which] may be above the amount listed at the box office,” 
resellers advocate for an unfettered opportunity to send this 
unique commodity to the highest bidder.215 For example, 
StubHub currently does not place any limits on ticket prices and 
 
 211 Better Online Ticket Sales Act § 2(c)(1)(A)-(C). 
 212 Investigations Team, Paradise Papers: Ticket Tout Julien Lavallee Set up 
Business in Tax Haven, BBC NEWS (Nov. 10, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-
scotland-41940205 [https://perma.cc/GY77-4CRA]. The authors note that the Paradise 
Papers revealed that one of the United Kingdom’s biggest “ticket touts,” Julien Lavallee 
had made thousands of pounds through selling concert tickets on StubHub. See id. The 
documents showed that given the speed of his purchases, which were within seconds of 
one another, it was likely that Lavalle was using bots to buy the tickets that he scalped. 
Id. Despite being warned of this behavior, not only did StubHub continue to allow 
Lavalle to use its website but the company “treat[ed] him as one of its ‘top sellers’” and 
provided him “discounts on fees.” Id. 
 213 See supra Section III.A. 
 214 Carmen Reinicke, What to Consider Before Buying a Concert Ticket from a 
Stranger, CNBC (Aug. 3, 2018, 10:07 AM ET), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/31/what-to-
consider-before-buying-a-concert-ticket-from-a-stranger.html [https://perma.cc/4A8E-98G6]. 
 215 Talib Visram, Ahead of the World Cup, FIFA Goes After the Ticket Resale 
Industry, CNN MONEY (June 8, 2018, 1:53 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/06/08/news/
companies/world-cup-fifa-ticket-resales/index.html [https://perma.cc/W8AB-6NBH]. 
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given that it collects a fee equal to 10% of the total transaction 
listing, in addition to the service fee it also collects from the 
buyer, so of course it supports an open market.216 The only actors 
who benefit from a laissez faire ticketing industry are the 
primary marketers, who can sell their product to consumers or 
scalpers; the scalpers, who have a limitless platform to sell their 
product to anyone willing to settle for greater than face value 
prices; and the secondary marketers, who profit twice off a ticket 
resale.217 The problem here: none of these actors are the ones 
performing or attending the show. The balance of interests 
between consumer opportunities and allowing a free market 
resale industry should weigh undeniably in the consumer’s 
favor. As the New York Attorney General noted, “Ticket buying, 
when presented to the public as a fair contest, should in fact be 
fair.”218 It is evident that primary marketers have an incentive 
to encourage scalping and more can be done to prevent it.219 
Current New York Arts and Cultural Affairs law provides 
that “[a]ny . . . website [serving] as a platform to facilitate 
resale . . . solely between third parties and [that] does not in any 
other manner engage in resales of tickets to places of 
entertainment shall be exempt from the licensing requirements.”220 
Essentially, this law allows secondary resale sites to legally serve 
as a platform for selling illegally obtained tickets in New York. 
Permitting this activity provides bots with a legal vehicle to profit 
off of their illegal activity and discourages the use of a primary 
marketer’s resale sites. In turn, this exposes consumers to 
exceedingly high-ticket profits and potentially counterfeit tickets. 
A similar issue was raised in the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals when a class of similarly situated plaintiffs brought a 
civil action against StubHub for allowing users to sell tickets for 
 
 216 Paul Moderator, Comment to Re: Total Fees Information, STUBHUB 
COMMUNITY, https://stubhub.community/t5/Selling-Tickets/Total-Fees-Information/td-
p/2935 [https://perma.cc/78L4-VDKU]; Reinicke, supra note 214. In June 2018, StubHub 
hailed the passing of New York legislation, stating that the bill “takes comprehensive 
steps to protect New York fans and ensure they benefit from having choice in a free and 
open market.” See Kramer, supra note 54. It is no surprise that StubHub favored the 
legislation, given that the state has still not imposed price limits on ticket resales or 
imposed criminal penalties for ticket speculation. 
 217 Reinicke, supra note 214 (noting that StubHub “will not place caps on 
ticket prices”). 
 218 See OBSTRUCTED VIEW, supra note 1, at 8. 
 219 Dave Seglins, et al., I’m Getting Ripped Off: A Look Inside Ticketmaster’s Price-
Hiking Bag of Tricks, CBC (Sept. 18, 2018, 4:00 AM ET), https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/
ticketmaster-prices-scalpers-bruno-mars-1.4826914 [https://perma.cc/4P2K-BJ5J]. 
 220 N.Y. ART & CULT. AFF. § 25.13 (McKinney 2009); FAQ—Ticket Reseller, supra 
note 37; see also Ticket Reseller License, NYC BUSINESS, https://www1.nyc.gov/nycbusiness/
description/ticket-reseller-license [https://perma.cc/H6E6-H3JT] (“Auction websites do not 
need licenses.”). 
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more than twice their face value in violation of North Carolina 
state laws.221 In response to StubHub’s defense of complete 
immunity under federal law, the court, finding that Section 230 
of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) applied to StubHub, 
held that the company did not violate the state ticket sales 
law.222 Section 230 provides that, “No provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider.”223 The majority noted that while the Supreme 
Court is silent as to the scope of the Act’s immunity, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit established that 
“Congress carved out a sphere of immunity from state lawsuits 
for providers of interactive computer services.”224 Further, the 
Hill court declined to adopt the Massachusetts Superior Court’s 
holding in NPC LLC v. StubHub, Inc, wherein StubHub was 
found to have “materially contributed to the illegal ‘ticket 
scalping’ of its sellers,” which would place StubHub outside the 
scope of the CDA’s immunity.225 
In Nemet Chevrolet Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., the 
Fourth Circuit held that Consumeraffairs.com, a business 
review website, was entitled to complete immunity under the 
CDA because it simply provided a platform for the defamatory 
statements that injured the plaintiff, rather than creating 
them.226 This ruling should not apply to StubHub because though 
it is a third party in the ticket scalping industry, it is not merely 
a “publisher” of ticket listing since it benefits from the 
transaction.227 A website like Consumeraffairs.com operates to 
create a public forum for business reviews and, in some instances, 
the platform is used to display defamatory content.228 Whereas 
StubHub relies on, and profits from, illegal ticket transactions, a 
percentage of the transaction between the scalper and the final 
 
 221 See Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 552–53 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012). The 
state laws at issue were N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-344, a statute making it unlawful to sell a 
ticket for more than $3.00 over its face value and North Carolina’s unfair and deceptive 
trade practice statute. Id. at 553. 
 222 Id. at 553, 564. 
 223 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1998). 
 224 StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d at 556 (quoting Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. 
Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 254 (4th Cir. 2009)). The Fourth Circuit stated, 
“Congress carved out a sphere of immunity from state lawsuits for providers of 
interactive computer services to preserve the ‘vibrant and competitive free market’ of 
ideas on the Internet.” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 
250, 254 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2012)). 
 225 NPS LLC v. StubHub, Inc., 2009 WL 995483, at *13 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Jan. 26, 2009). 
 226 See Consumeraffairs.com, 591 F.3d 250, 252, 254, 260 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 227 See StubHub, 727 S.E.2d at 560–61. 
 228 Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d at 254. 
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buyer goes directly to StubHub as a fee for the website’s service.229 
Therefore, StubHub should not be labeled as an “information 
content provider,” because rather than providing simply a 
platform for illegal conduct, the purpose of the website itself is to 
incentivize illegal ticket scalping.230 Thus, the New York State 
Attorney General may use his enforcement power to enjoin 
secondary marketers, like StubHub, from allowing illegally 
obtained tickets to be sold on their website. 
It may be argued that StubHub is beyond the scope of the 
current New York laws because the language in Section 25.24(5) 
of the New York Arts and Cultural Affairs Law provides that 
only corporations “who knowingly resell[ ]  or offer[ ]  to 
resell . . . shall be subject to [civil liability].”231 StubHub can, 
however, be held accountable on grounds that the company had 
constructive knowledge that tickets being sold on its website 
were obtained illegally.232 Therefore, given its role in the ticketing 
industry, Section 25.24(5) would apply to StubHub under a theory 
of constructive knowledge. At the outset, secondary marketers 
can be held liable for allowing speculative listings on their sites, 
as it is easy to detect when tickets have been released by the 
primary marketer.233 
Additionally, in order to prevent the argument against the 
constructive knowledge theory, the New York State legislature 
could amend the language of Section 25.24(4) to ensure that ticket 
resale sites are addressed. Since the law already provides liability 
for corporations who “resell[ ]  or offer[ ]  to resell a ticket that 
such . . . corporation . . . knows was obtained using ticket 
purchasing software,” the language of the law could be amended 
to include corporations that knows or should have known the 
ticket was obtained using ticket purchasing software.234 
Amending the language of the law would expand the scope of the 
state’s regulation on ticket resellers to ensure that all parties 
reselling tickets that are obtained illegally are held liable. 
The caveat to this solution is that it is still a reactive 
measure, akin to the general trend of legislative and independent 
actions taken to address ticket scalping. Also, with many of the 
 
 229 Katy Osborn, Why StubHub Is Tacking on Ticket Fees Again, TIME (Sept. 1, 2015), 
http://time.com/money/4018864/stubhub-fees-all-in-ticket-prices/ [https://perma.cc/
ML3D-VHPP]. 
 230 Contra StubHub, 727 S.E.2d at 560. 
 231 N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 25.24(5) (McKinney 2017) (emphasis added). 
 232 Constructive knowledge is “[k]nowledge that one using reasonable care or 
diligence should have, and therefore that is attributed by law to a given person.” 
Knowledge, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 233 See supra Section II.A. 
 234 N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. § 25.24(5) (McKinney 2017). 
294 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:1 
attempts to regulate the secondary market, it is likely that bot 
users will adapt to this hurdle and may find other means of selling 
illicitly obtained tickets. Therefore, the New York State 
legislature must act further. 
B. Primary Marketer Accountability 
In order to fully establish regulatory control over the 
secondary market the problem must be addressed at its source. 
Since the primary marketer releases its tickets to the public 
through the initial sale, it therefore controls how tickets are 
distributed at the outset.235 The New York State legislature 
should then hold the primary marketers liable for how their 
tickets are distributed and who is able to buy them. While 
Ticketmaster claims to be a victim of the secondary market and 
its recent initiatives are indicative of its intentions to aid 
consumers, whether scalpers or consumers are buying the tickets, 
the demand for concert tickets still exists. 
For example, if an event has five hundred general 
admission tickets, Ticketmaster’s profit from ticket sales does 
not change whether five hundred fans or one broker buys the 
tickets. Ticketmaster’s pricing schematic is set up so that it can 
profit from a recurring fan base and additional sales made 
during the concert, like food, beverages, and merchandise.236 
When the primary marketer is still making its expected profit from 
the original ticket sale, however, consumers and artists are the real 
victims in the industry. Since merging with Live Nation in 2010, 
Ticketmaster is now one of few primary ticket marketers.237 
Therefore, a diminished recurring fan base hurts the artists more 
than the primary marketer because fans do not have many 
alternatives to Ticketmaster for primary ticket purchases. 
Given the primary marketer’s role in the ticketing 
industry, the only way to prevent the secondary market from 
continuing to grow out of control would be to regulate the 
original transaction, as opposed to trying to recover from activity 
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that has already occurred. This would mean that the primary 
marketer should be held liable for their tickets being purchased 
illegally, in a similar way that secondary marketers would be 
liable for allowing illegally purchased tickets to be sold and 
purchased on their websites. Imposing liability on the primary 
marketer would incentivize companies like Ticketmaster to 
ensure that the original purchaser of the tickets is more likely 
to be the person attending the event, but also providing 
exceptions for gifts and similar purchases for another person. 
While the Attorney General has suggested that primary 
marketers should take action to reduce bot use, these measures 
are still reactive.238 The Attorney General’s recommendations to 
primary marketers include: “preemptively enforcing ticket 
limits, analyzing purchase data to identify ongoing Bot 
operations, and investigating resellers regularly offering large 
numbers of tickets to popular shows.”239 Currently, ticket limits 
are inconsistently enforced because while there may be a ticket 
limit per purchase, there is no purchase limit.240 Even if these 
ticket limits are enforced so that the number of purchases is 
limited per person, scalpers have already found ways around 
this.241 These recommendations ultimately fail to incentivize 
primary marketers to reform their purchasing mechanisms 
because there is no accountability. The Attorney General has 
simply recommended that the primary marketers make a change, 
without seeking to enforce that they do so. Moreover, rather 
trying to divide the primary and secondary ticket markets, 
primary marketers have instead started to market themselves as 
secondary market players too.242 
 
 238 See OBSTRUCTED VIEW, supra note 1, at 35. 
 239 Id. 
 240 Cuccinello, supra note 202 (“As for ticket limits, they are inconsistently 
enforced by ticketing platforms and have an easy loophole. For instance, Ticketmaster’s 
ticket limit only applies to single transactions.”). 
 241 See Koebler, supra, note 60. 
 242 See supra Section III.A. While Ticketmaster shut down its European resale 
sites, Seatwave and Get Me In in August 2018 due to negative customer feedback, they 
have been replaced by Ticketmaster’s new fan-to-fan ticket exchange, which is due to 
launch throughout Europe in 2019. Sean Keane, Ticketmaster Shuts Down UK Ticket 
Resale Sites, Launches ‘Fan-to-Fan’ Exchange, CNET (Aug. 13, 2018, 4:10 AM PDT), 
https://www.cnet.com/news/ticketmaster-shuts-down-uk-ticket-resale-sites-launches-fan-
to-fan-ticket-exchange/ [https://perma.cc/H2VM-Q555]. Though the program is designed 
to allow fans to buy or sell tickets at the original price or less, “some . . . believe that 
Ticketmaster will charge higher prices for all of the other extras that come with buying 
tickets,” thereby “filling the role of the ‘tout.’” Jonathan Yates, How Ticketmaster Fan-
to-Fan Exchange Will Work and Getting Cheaper Tickets, MANCHESTER EVENING NEWS 
(Aug. 16, 2018, 12:42 PM), https://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/whats-on/whats-
on-news/how-ticketmaster-fan-fan-exchange-15023421 [https://perma.cc/M57V-R9DC]. 
296 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:1 
Current federal and New York state legislation penalizes 
ticket scalpers who have already caused harm to the consumer, 
rather than preventing the primary marketer from letting a 
scalper illegally obtain tickets. New York law aims to deter 
scalping through penalties for bot usage,243 but there is still no 
way to actually prevent them from using bots to buy tickets. 
While Ticketmaster has put forth their own initiatives through 
the Verified Fan Program and “slow ticketing,” the secondary 
ticket market has continued to grow, thereby calling for a 
wholesale change in the ticket purchasing process.244 
C. Securing Primary Ticket Purchases 
If primary marketers are incentivized to make a change, 
they could implement purchasing systems similar to those used 
by airlines.245 Unlike concert tickets, airline tickets are 
traditionally non-transferable.246 While concert tickets should still 
remain transferable, the transfer must only be approved by the 
primary marketers as the ticket should include the purchaser’s 
information. That purchaser must then be present for the show, 
but an additional document could be provided by the primary 
marketer if the ticket is purchased as a gift for a show that the 
purchaser is not attending. If the ticket is a gift, the primary 
marketer could then require that the recipient’s name be put on 
the ticket during the purchase. This would prevent scalpers from 
simply making every purchase a gift, because they would not 
know who their clients are until after they have purchased the 
tickets from the primary marketer. Similar to the secure nature 
of an airline ticket, the primary marketer could require secure 
information, such as a driver’s license number that could be 
more difficult to falsify than a name or email address.247 To add 
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an extra step in the transfer process, primary marketers could 
also add a certain time period that the tickets could be 
transferred during, that way there is not a last-minute rush for 
scalpers to sell their unpurchased tickets right before the show. 
It has been suggested that primary marketers could adopt 
a dynamic pricing system similar to that of most airlines.248 This 
system, however, would inevitably inflate the market for last 
minute ticket sales, thereby forcing the primary marketer to 
charge a higher price than was originally intended for tickets 
during their initial release.249 Additionally, a ticket to an event 
is unlike an airline ticket because there are many airline, flight, 
and timing options to destinations at around the same place, 
whereas a concert ticket is a unique commodity that is only 
available for a single occasion. While primary marketers should 
not adopt the same dynamic pricing schematic that airlines use, 
if similar security measures used in airline tickets are applied 
to event tickets sales, it will be harder or even impossible for 
scalpers to transfer them, causing a potentially fatal roadblock 
for ticket scalping operations. Requiring consumers to provide 
their passport information may be an overzealous precaution, 
but requiring a government-issued driver’s license number could 
be a sufficient way to attach the purchaser to the concert 
attendee as it would be less likely to falsify than a credit card 
number or email address.250 
CONCLUSION 
There are two ends to a ticket sale: the consumer who 
uses the ticket for his or her own enjoyment or that of another, 
and the scalper who purchases the ticket for resale with the 
expectation of a worthy profit. Once the ticket leaves the 
primary marketer’s control there are limited ways to regulate 
the future transactions related to that ticket and ensure that the 
final purchaser is able to attend the event. While it seems that 
ticket scalping has existed for as long as tickets themselves, 
today’s dominant scalping practices have created a gap between 
the sale of tickets and how those sales can be regulated.251 As has 
been the case with other industries’ struggles with malicious 
technology, the ticketing industry has become “a cops and 
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robbers game in which malware developers are a step ahead.”252 
Although the New York State legislature has taken steps toward 
regulating the secondary market and the Attorney General has 
prevented large brokers from continuing their illegal practices, 
the secondary ticket market has continued to grow exponentially 
with few hiccups. While a lack of transparency from primary 
marketers regarding the number of tickets that are actually 
available is part of the problem, another flaw in regulating the 
ticketing industry has been that current legislation seeks to 
deter future illegal ticket purchases rather than prevent them. 
To effectively control the secondary ticket market and 
allow consumers a fair opportunity to purchase tickets at face 
value, primary ticket marketers must be held accountable for 
how tickets are purchased at the outset. Primary marketer 
accountability will stop the secondary ticket market from 
controlling what class of people are able to attend events. By 
cutting off the issue at its source, the need for reactive legislation 
and enforcement against ticket scalpers will be unnecessary, as 
the tickets will have, if at all, reached scalpers in a way that 
allows regular consumers the opportunity to purchase their 
tickets at face value. Regulation of this nature will allow the 
artists to profit off of the sale of every ticket sold to their events, 
as the tickets would be transferred and sold through the primary 
marketer’s control, allowing the same pricing and compensation 
schematic to be re-applied. Therefore, unlike previous legislation, 
imposing liability on the primary market for how its tickets enter 
the market will be a proactive measure toward a preventative 
solution rather than another reactive penalty. 
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